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Today’s smart-phones are ubiquitous in people’s lives, collecting and storing private
and confidential data. At the same time, users are exposed to mobile apps with bad
engineering practices and to malicious apps, both endangering the security of their data.
This happens because app stores face considerable challenges, like the efficient analysis
of the huge volume of apps received, the moving target nature of the threats and the lack
of accuracy of users’ feedback.
In this dissertation we present a study on the use of automated verification tools of
applications at the app market level for improving the security of the end users. This
study led to a platform that combines static analysis tools for Android apps with users’
feedback to determine the apps threat level. We implemented this platform as a module
and evaluated it in Aptoide - an Android app store - to support the quality assurance
decisions of app inspection, which might lead to the removal of the app from the store.
The assessment shows that for the 19% of the APKs ranked with the highest threat
level, the proposed module only failed in 2%. This means that, in a context of an app store
that receives thousands of apps per day, the module is able to inform with considerable
certainty which apps need to be inspected by the quality assurance team with urgency,
because are likely a threat to consumers. Therefore, the proposed solution contributes to
accelerate the app store response to mobile threats and, consequently, to the reduction of
its impact on app consumers.
Although the module improves and strengthens the application verification process
by uncovering problems that were not previously exposed, after we made more tests we
realised that the specification of these problems could be further adjusted.





Hoje em dia temos à nossa disposição telefones sofisticados, tablets e wearables, que nos
permitem fazer quase tudo. Com uma peça de hardware tão pequena, temos o mundo à
nossa disposição dentro do alcance de uma app. No entanto a utilização destas aplicações
que coletam e armazenam dados privados e confidenciais, representam uma ameaça à
segurança do utilizador quando são compostas por más práticas de engenharia ou de más
intenções. Isto acontece devido aos grandes desafios que as app stores enfrentam num
mundo cada vez mais digital, como a análise eficiente do grande volume de aplicações
recebidas diariamente, a constante mudança da origem das ameaças móveis e devido à
falta de precisão de feedback dada pelos utilizadores.
Nesta dissertação apresentamos um estudo sobre a utilização de ferramentas de verifi-
cação automatizada de aplicações ao nível das app stores de modo a melhorar a segurança
dos seus utilizadores. Este estudo levou nos ao desenvolvimento de uma plataforma que
combina ferramentas de análise estática para aplicações Android com o feedback dos
utilizadores, de modo a determinar o nível de ameaça de uma aplicação. Implementamos
esta plataforma como um módulo que suporta as decisões da equipa que controla a quali-
dade das aplicações e a sua avaliação foi feita no contexto da Aptoide - uma app store de
aplicações Android.
A avaliação mostrou-nos que, para os 19% dos APKs classificados com o maior nível
de ameaça, o módulo proposto falha apenas em 2%. Isso significa que, num contexto
de uma app store que recebe milhares de aplicações por dia, este módulo é capaz de
informar com considerável certeza que aplicações necessitam de urgentemente passar
por uma inspeção manual da equipa que controla a qualidade. Pois, provavelmente, são
uma ameaça para os consumidores. Portanto, a solução proposta contribui para acelerar
a resposta da app store às ameaças móveis e, consequentemente, para reduzir o impacto
negativo sobre os consumidores.
Embora este módulo melhore e fortaleça o processo de verificação de aplicações, des-
cobrindo problemas que não eram anteriormente expostos, depois de termos efetuado
mais testes, percebemos que a especificação destes problemas poderia ser ajustada.
Keywords: aplicações Android, serviços de app store, controlo da qualidade de apli-
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This chapter contains an introduction to the accomplished work in this dissertation. It
begins by presenting a description of its context and problem, and what its goals are. The
main contributions are also presented below.
1.1 Context
Android has become the most used mobile operating system in the world. In March 2017,
the world’s largest app store, Google’s Play Store, had 2.8 million applications, Apple
App Store 2.2 million and the Amazon app store (Android) had 600,000 applications, the
same number of Aptoide [Staa]. In 2016 alone there were over 149 billion downloaded
applications, worldwide [Stab]. However the noticed exponential growth of mobile ap-
plications downloaded has been followed by an increase of security threats of the mobile
devices. These threats are made to sensitive data, such as the location, contacts and finan-
cial information of the user, stored by these applications. The Nokia threat intelligence
report has shown that the overall monthly smart-phone infection rate averaged 0.90% in
the second half of 2016 - up 83% from the first half of the year and also highlights the
most prolific threats facing mobile devices. Where mobile applications are concerned,
this variety of applications can be harmful to the integrity and security of devices and
data by leaking sensitive information. These applications are usually free, and have the
ability to carry out their proposed functions, but also extract important information from
devices. This sensitive information is then sent to a remote server where the cybercrim-
inals can exploit it [Com]. With millions of applications in an app store environment,
and more being created every day, the developers goal is to make the next most popular
app. They are not focused on security [Inf]. Thus, many of the problems found in an
application stem not only from the illicit tries to capture information but also from the
1
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lack of good security practices in application development, which facilitates the success
of threats. Software weaknesses have become one of the top problems in recent years, for
there are many ways software developers can make mistakes that can lead to insecurity.
Every one of these weaknesses is subtle and many are tricky. Software developers are not
taught about these weaknesses in school and most receive no training on the job about
these problems [OWAa].
This is a global issue, spanning most countries that have a significant smart-phone user
base. Different countries have different threat profiles, depending on the nature of mobile
phone usage in the country [McA]. The fact that these threats have been changing makes
them continue to succeed in their illicit purposes, due to the lack of automatic intelligent
mechanisms capable of detecting and mitigating them efficiently [Nar+16]. Given the
moving target nature of the threats on the mobile security arena and the considerable
challenge that outcomes from the high volume of applications received on the app stores,
the users are key actors on the detection and response to attacks not blocked by app
stores. The fast analysis of their feedback is key to a swift removal of the threats from
the repositories and, thus, reduce the impact on consumers. Even if the users’ feedback
is not frequently accurate, during this paper we have taken it into consideration. We find
it to be a key on the detection and response to attacks not blocked by app stores, given
that their feedback could be a way of work around the moving target nature of the threats
stemming from the poor engineering choices.
1.2 Problem
The recent survey made by the Stackoverflow website about the developers profile (favourite
technologies, coding habits, and work preferences, as well as how they learn) shows that
about 65% of mobile developers work with Android [Staa]. This platform has gained
over 85% of the smart-phone market, [Stab] and just its official app store contains more
than 2.8 million applications. As a result, a security mistake in an in-house applica-
tion may jeopardise the security and privacy [CVE] of billions of users. The security
of smart-phones has been studied from various perspectives such as the device manu-
facturer [Wu+13], its platform [Xu+16], and end users [JC15]. Manifold security APIs,
protocols, guidelines, and tools are proposed. Nevertheless, security concerns, in effect,
are outweighed by other concerns [BC14]. Many developers undermine their significant
role in providing security [Xie+11]. As a result, applications still suffer from serious
proliferating security issues. For instance, the analysis of 100 popular applications down-
loaded at least 10M times, revealed that over 90% of them, due to development mistakes,
are prone to SSL vulnerabilities that allow criminals to access credit card numbers, chat
messages, contact list, files, and credentials [OC15].
After an empirical study made by a research team in Switzerland [Gha+17], where
they have statically analysed 46 000 applications from the AndroZoo and Google Play
data set they have concluded that despite the diversity of applications in popularity, size,
2
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and release date, the majority suffer from at least three different security vulnerabilities
(XSS-like code injection, dynamic code loading and the use of custom scheme channels
and expose a unique hardware identifier).
Despite the best efforts of app stores, the existing markets provide little meaningful
security or privacy guarantees because market providers have neither the tools nor the re-
sources to perform a detailed analysis of submitted applications [ME10]. Then malicious
applications can enter their ecosystem e.g., app installation from untrusted sources, in-
ability to detect malicious behaviour in applications, access of malicious websites. Hence,
there is a need to develop automatic tools and techniques that can detect vulnerabilities
in the submitted applications [RM18].
1.3 Goals
1.3.1 General
An automated validation of applications at the app market level is a promising approach
for improving the security of the end users. In this thesis, we foresee a validation process
applied by app stores to applications submitted by the developers and we present a
system that aims to achieve this goal.
At a high level, the system goal is of devising an automatic tool for targeting the
inspection of applications with programming malpractices (due to poor implementation
/ engineering choices).
1.3.2 Specific
For that purpose we propose the construction of a tool supported by automated analysis
tools that would analyse applications and based on that analysis would estimate the threat
that an application represents.
To estimate the threat level of an application, we propose the elaboration of metrics
based on the quantity of the problems found as well as the amount of users’ feedback
that an application has. During this dissertation we gave value to the users’ feedback, so
we could analyse its impact on the detection and response to attacks not blocked by app
stores. Giving us a way of work around the moving target nature of the threats stemming
from the poor engineering choices.
By elaborating metrics related to quantity parameters, it is possible to promote adjust-
ments and changes in the development process, in order to reduce or eliminate causes of
problems that significantly affect the threat level estimation system.
The proposed metrics will undergo an experimental evaluation and a validation ap-




The main contribution of this dissertation is the definition, implementation and evalua-
tion of a module capable of targeting the inspection of applications with programming
malpractices, in order to provide to app stores an automatic tool able to give a threat level
system of the submitted applications after a detailed analysis.
This threat level system would inform an app store of which of the submitted applica-
tions pose the biggest threat to their ecosystem. Giving to an app store a tool to improve
security or privacy guarantees.
Another contribution is the definition and evaluation of metrics for the threat level
system, in order to support the quantitative evaluation of the submitted applications.
Based on the related work there is still no well-accepted solution to the problem; quoting
from the paper Static Analysis of Android Apps: A Systematic Literature Review [Li+17]
”There is no single work that has been proposed to tackle all challenges of static analysis
that are related to Android programming”. Therefore, the metrics are proposed according
to the data we obtained from the analysis of the module.
We also performed an experimental evaluation where the metrics are applied to a set











This chapter contains important concepts pertaining to software verification and vali-
dation techniques, security vulnerabilities and static analysis tools. Its main objective
is to introduce some important concepts that are related to this dissertation, making a
framework of it.
2.1 Software Verification and Validation Techniques
The verification and validation of software is typically done through three techniques:
manual code review[Gee16], automatic analysis comprehended between dynamic[Bal99]
or static[Wic+95] approaches and semi-automatic with theorem provers [Duf91].
A manual code review depends entirely on the reviewer and it is conducted to find
bugs and improve overall quality of the software [Sma], while an automated code review
checks source code for compliance with a predefined set of properties, rules or best
practices [Cas]. In conclusion automated code review solutions have advantages over
a manual audit, for they are able to complete the review at a much faster pace, there is
not the possibility of human error, they improve code coverage, and are more effective
and ultimately more affordable. However, an automatic review does not eliminate the
need for a human reviewer, as they produce both false positive and false negative results
[Sma].
The techniques used in automated code analysis can be either static or dynamic. Static
analysis is done by inspecting a program (on source, binary or byte code level) without
actually executing the program. Dynamic analysis runs a program to observe its actions
in an effort to uncover more subtle defects or vulnerabilities.
Both static and dynamic analysis have their advantages and limitations. A dynamic
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analysis reveals subtle defects or vulnerabilities whose cause is too complex to be discov-
ered by static analysis. It plays a role in security assurance, but it will only find defects in
the part of the code that is actually executed. In the other hand, static analysis examines
all possible execution paths and variable values, not just those invoked during execution
[Int].
After we weigh these considerations with the complexities of our own project, we have
chosen static analysis as the selection criteria of the tools to be integrated in our system.
2.2 Static Analysis
Static analysis is a method of computer program debugging that is done by examining
the code without executing the program [Tecb]. In most cases the analysis is performed
on some version of the source code, and in the other cases, some form of the object code.
There are also some static analysis tools that make their analysis at the byte-code level.
There are multiple advantages to static analyse code such as revealing errors, or identify-
ing code fragments that can lead to errors in the future [PVS]. Besides many automatic
static analysis tools can detect problems at security, reliability and functionality levels.
They are useful for security threats such as buffer overflows, SQL Injection Flaws, and so
forth [Tecb]. However, there are weaknesses too. There are many types of security vul-
nerabilities that are very difficult to find, such as authentication problems, access control
issues, insecure use of cryptography, etc. The current state-of-the-art only allows such
tools to automatically find a relatively small number of application security flaws. Config-
uration issues are also something hard to find since they are not represented in the code.
The same happens to proving that an identified security issue is an actual vulnerability.
Many of these tools have difficulty analysing code that cannot be compiled. Analysts
frequently cannot compile code because they do not have the right libraries, all the com-
pilation instructions, all the code, etc [OWAb]. There is also the problem of false positives.
Correct tools/approaches never give false negatives, i.e., never say a “bad” program (one
that has violations of the property) has no problems. Complete tools/approaches are
unattainable for non-trivial properties, since by the Rice’s Theorem [Wika], they are un-
decidable for Turing-complete computational mechanisms [Wikb]. Furthermore, Godel’s
incompleteness theorems [Sci] ensure that some properties are improvable and moreover,
there are no “interesting” reasoning mechanisms both consistent and complete. There-
fore, static analysis cannot be precise and to be correct must over-approximate and give
false positives.
2.3 Security Vulnerabilities
There is a vast amount of published work on the topic of Android security analysis. We
began our research by learning and analysing the different types of vulnerabilities to be
expected in Android applications. According to a present study on security smells in
6
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Android [Gha+17], in resume, there are 28 code smells (symptoms in the code that signal
the prospect of a security vulnerability) that may lead to vulnerabilities in applications
and show their prevalence in real-world Android applications. From those 28 identified
code smells, we have selected a 14 according to the conclusions observed in the study.
From the category Insufficient Attack Protection, we selected 3 problems: untrustwor-
thy libraries, outdated libraries and unnecessary permissions. From the category Security
Validation, we selected one problem: weak cryptographic algorithm. From the category
Broken Access Control, we selected 4 problems: unauthorised intent, unconstrained inter-
component communication, exposed adb-level capabilities and debuggable release. From
the category sensitive data exposure, we selected 3 problems: exposed persistent data,
insecure network protocol and exposed credentials. From the category lax input valida-
tion, we have chosen 3 problems: XSS-like code injection, dynamic code loading and SQL
injections.
The categorisation and explanation of the selected problems are described below and
are summarised in Table 2.1.
Category Security Vulnerability
Insufficient Attack Protection Untrustworthy Libraries,
Outdated Library,
Unnecessary Permissions
Security Invalidation Weak Crypto Algorithm




Sensitive Data Exposure Sensitive Data Exposure,
Insecure Network Protocol,
Exposed Credentials
Lax Input Validation XSS-like Code Injection,
Dynamic Code Loading,
SQL Injection
Table 2.1: Security vulnerabilities summary.
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Insufficient Attack Protection
• Untrustworthy Libraries
To cope with the complexity of modern software systems and as way to speed up the
process of development of an application, the developers usually rely on the func-
tionalities provided by off-the-shelf libraries. This is a problem since these libraries
are often maintained by different developers and, as the result, their update cycles
generally do not coincide when there are bug fixes and improvements in newer
releases [Gha+17]. Consequently, a security breach in an old library or a deprecated
API could lead to serious issues, i.e., introduce vulnerabilities and compromise user
data [Wat+17].
• Outdated Library
Libraries usually offer various bug fixes and improvements in newer releases, but
often different developers maintain libraries and applications, and their update
cycles generally do not coincide. Consequently, a security breach in an old library
or a deprecated API could lead to serious issues [Gha+17]
• Unnecessary Permissions
The use of protected features on Android devices requires explicit permissions,
and developers occasionally ask for more permissions than necessary [TM16]. The
more permission-protected features an app can access, the more sensitive data it
can reach. Consequently, a more permission-hungry app may expose users to addi-
tional security risks [TM17].
Security Invalidation
• Weak Crypto Algorithm
The fundamental set of cryptograph algorithms can be categorised into symmetric,
asymmetric, and hash functions. The use of weak cryptographic hash functions like
SHA1 or MD5, insecure modes e.g., ECB for block ciphers, could subject to security
issues [Gha+17].
Broken Access Control
• Unauthorised Intent Receipt
An intent is an abstract specification of an operation that applications can use to
utilise the actions provided by other applications. An explicit intent guarantees
communication with the specified recipient, but it is the Android system that de-
termines the recipient(s) of an implicit intent among available applications. The
existence of an intent with private data, but without a particular component name
(the fully-qualified class name) [Gha+17], can be a target for a threat called intent
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hijacking could arise in which user information carried by the intent could be ma-
nipulated or leaked [Chi+11].
• Unconstrained Inter-Component Communication
Since Android applications can reuse components (e.g., activities, services, content
provider, and broadcast receivers) from other applications trough the intent-filter
element or android:exported = true attribute in the manifest file without any per-
mission check to ensure that a client app is originally permitted to receive that
service, a threat called component hijacking can arise when a malicious app esca-
lates its privilege for originally prohibited operations through other applications
that access those operations [Wu+16], [Dav+11].
• Exposed adb-level Capabilities
The Android Debug Bridge (adb) is a versatile tool that provides communication
with a connected Android device. Many developers opt for adb-level capabilities
to legitimately access a subset of signature-level resources [Lin+14]. If an app
communicates locally with an adb-level proxy through the TCP sockets opened
on the same device, which exposes the adb server to any app with the INTERNET
permission, a malign app with ordinary permissions can command the adb and
establish serious attacks [Hwa+15].
• Debuggable Release
During app development there exist two major build configurations, debug and
release. The first is meant for active development, while the latter is for signed in-
market releases. However, developers may forget to switch to release mode before
publishing an app [Xu+13]. Hence the manifest file will contain the attribute an-
droid:debuggable = true. Applications shipped with debugging enabled always try
to connect to a local Unix socket opened by the Android Debug Bridge (adb). While
adb is not running on every consumer device, a malign app could disguise itself as
an adb service and connect to random debuggable applications. Consequently, a
malicious app is able to gain full access to the Java process and can execute arbitrary
code in the context of the debuggable app [MWR].
Sensitive Data Exposure
• Exposed Persistent Data
Android provides various storage options to store persistent data. These options
vary depending on the size, type, and accessibility of data [Dav+11]. If a developer
chooses a particular option without considering its security implication, , private
9
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data can be exposed. For example if in the application there is a private storage
with global access scope (i.e., MODE_WORLD_READABLE or MODE_WORLD
_WRITEABLE), the app relies on ContentProvider to access data, but there is no
access restriction for other applications.
• Insecure Network Protocol
There are many channels devoted to data transportation, however insecure ones like
HTTP are more prevalent and easy to maintain. These insecure channels transfer
un-encrypted data, giving a chance to relay the data and possibly alter it by the
attackers.
• Exposed Credentials
Passwords, private keys, secret keys, certificates, and other similar credentials are
commonly used for authentication, communication, or data encryption. If the app
contains hard-coded credentials, or they are stored without any password protec-
tion such as when the KeyStore.ProtectionParameter is null, in some circumstances
such data is inadvertently disclosed to unauthorised parties. Which could break the
intended security [Gha+17].
Lax Input Validation
• XSS-like Code Injection
WebView is an essential component that enables developers to use web technolo-
gies such as HTML and JavaScript to deliver web content within an app. Unlike
Web browsers like Chrome, FireFox, etc. which are developed by well-recognised
companies that we trust, each app using a WebView is like a customised browser
which may not have undergone thorough security tests. If the setJavaScriptEnabled
call with value true which enables execution of JavaScript exists in the code, and
the app fetches web content from untrustworthy sources (e.g., by calling loadUrl
or loadData on WebView) without applying proper sanity checks [Gha+17], this
means that the app may load web content unsafely i.e., without sanitising the input
from any code. Consequently, an adversary could inject malicious code through any
channel that the app uses to get web content [Jin+14].
• Dynamic Code Loading
Android allows applications to load and execute external code and resources, trough
the use of any class loader. Although dynamic code loading is widely adopted, devel-
opers are often unaware of the risks associated to this generally unsafe mechanism
or fail to implement it securely [SPV14]. An attacker can replace the code that is to
be loaded with a malicious one. Consequently, this can lead to severe vulnerabilities
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such as remote code injection [Fal+15].
• SQL Injection
If a developer does not make a proper validation of the input that is passed to the
database and if the application was developed to directly use the input to build a
query that will be run by the database engine; an attacker who succeeds at insert-
ing malicious code into SQL statements, can access or modify the data from the
database.
2.4 Static Analysis Tools
In this section we present our search process on static analysis tools and the decisions
made during that process. To select tools for the module, we have restricted the search to
the following factors:
• Free
We searched for solutions that were freely available, ignoring the payed ones.
• Maintained
During the selection of the tools we gave preference to the solutions that were
actively maintained. Since in most cases the unmaintained/abandoned tools do not
support the currently supported versions of Android.
• Security Vulnerabilities Detection
From the multiple tools we have encountered, we have selected the ones capable
of flag signs of malicious behaviour in an application according to the security
vulnerabilities we have chosen to target (see section 2.3). Despite the many tools
available for vulnerability detection (typically used by app developers), we have
chosen to not pursue them since our target are APKs1. For using such tools it would
be necessary to have the source code of the application and for that purpose we
would have to get the source code from each APK1. Although we tried to follow
that path through the use of reverse engineering tools, it showed us that due to the
obfuscation of parts of the code that some applications have, combined with the
fact that some tools are restrained to a limited set of android versions, this was not
a viable solution.
• Minimal Adaptation
We were also interested in solutions that could detect malicious behaviours with
none or minimal adaptation, e.g., build an extension to detect a specific vulnera-
bility. The ground behind this decision was to eliminate human bias and errors
1APK explained in chapter 3
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involved in identifying, creating, and using the proper modifications. This way we
could maintain a typical workflow: build the tool, follow the documentation, and
apply it to the APKs.
To select tools for this evaluation, we collected information from repositories and blog
posts approaching Android security solutions. We then considered 8 tools: AndroBugs
[Gita], AndroWarn [Deb], Argus-SAF [Gitb], DroidRA [Li+16], Evicheck [Evi], MobSF
[Gitc], Qark [Gitd] and SUPER [Gite]; and evaluated them by reading their documentation
and the available resources.
Since we focused on selecting only maintained tools, we rejected AndroWarn as it was
not updated after 2013 [Deb]. We also rejected a tool if we had error messages that has
no clear fixes by exploring the available bug report. This resulted in rejecting DroidRA
[Li+16].
Of the remaining tools, we tested 6 local tools using 10 APKs (Android Package) from
Google Play store. The APKs tested were divided into 5 categories, Banking, In-app
purchases, Games, Privacy and Tools. For the banking category we have chosen MB
Way [Plag] and Wallet [Plaj]; for the in-app purchases category we have chosen Drink
Water [Plac] and Freeletics Bodyweight [Plae]; for the games category we have chose
Clash Royale [Plab] and Millionaire 2018 [Plah]; for the privacy category we have chosen
LOCKit [Plaf] and My Passwords - Password Manager [Plai]; finally for the tools category
we have chosen Always On AMOLED [Plaa] and Flashlight [Plad]. We executed each
tool with each of the above applications as input on an Ubuntu Xenial Xerus with the
following features: Processor: Intel Core i5-6200U CPU @ 2.30GHz × 4 and Memory: 7,2
GiB. If a tool failed to execute successfully on all of these applications, then we rejected
the tool. We rejected Argus-SAF because it ran out of time or memory while processing
the test apps [Gitb]. The results were grouped by the remaining 5 tools in appendixes: A,
B, C, D and E.
In the following we will describe and present each tool and point out some of their
main features.
AndroBugs is an android vulnerability scanner. It is a Python framework that targets
application developers only. It is based on AndroGuard, which it uses to decompile
APKs. Based on a present list of vulnerability vectors, it scans code hotspots to find
any potentially vulnerable code, function calls or fields, and then goes to the source
function of those issues and reanalysis the code to confirm its findings [Pet]. Once it
discovers security issues, AndroBugs will dump data inside the user’s terminal, data
that holds information on the vulnerability vector’s type, code path inside the APK’s
source, severity level, detailed explanations, mitigation recommendations, and even some
reference research papers, if available [Cim].
Evicheck is a tool for the verification, certification and generation of lightweight fine-
grained policies for Android. It uses a lightweight static analysis to show the conformance
between policies and application behaviour. These policies are a set of rules defined by the
12
2.4. STATIC ANALYSIS TOOLS
user and can be about the use of APIs, permissions allowed or anti-malware patterns. In
the verification mode, it takes an application together with a policy as input, and answers
whether the policy is satisfied by the application and eventually outputs a certificate
(digital evidence). EviCheck also returns diagnosis pointing to the first violated rule of
policy [Seg].
Mobile Security Framework is an open source mobile application (Android/iOS) au-
tomated pen-testing framework capable of performing static and dynamic analysis. The
static analyser can perform automated code review, detect insecure permissions and con-
figurations, and detect insecure code like SSL overriding or bypass, weak cryptography,
obfuscated codes, improper permissions, hard-coded secrets, improper usage of danger-
ous APIs, leakage of sensitive/PII information, and insecure file storage [Cyb].
Qark is a static code analysis tool, designed to recognise potential security vulnera-
bilities and points of concern for Java-based Android applications. It stands for Quick
Android Review Kit and is a tool capable of inform developers about potential risks re-
lated to Android application security, providing clear descriptions of issues and links to
authoritative reference sources [Tru].
Super Android Analyser is a command-line application that analyses APKs in search
for vulnerabilities. It does this by decompressing them and applying a series of rules to
detect those vulnerabilities. It is written in Rust and detects SQL injections, XSS attacks,
superuser checking applications, URL disclosure, weak algorithms, dangerous permis-
sions, sending sms-mms, get device ID, cell location, get SIM serial and bad practices
[Egu].
Although, there are tools that find the same issues we have chosen to use them all
together. This decision was made because we observed that even if the same issues are
reported, these tools do not operate the same way. For several apps we got, for some of
the tools, different outputs for the analysis of the same issue (weak cryptography use,
for example, is reported differently between Androbugs and SUPER). We concluded that
the tools complement each other and decided to use them together. Meaning that we
can have two tools that analyse, for example weak cryptography use, but have different
outputs. So these different results complement each other.
Table 2.2 shows the relation between the selected tools and the security vulnerabilities






















Security Vulnerability AndroBugs EviCheck MobSF QARK SUPER
Untrustworthy Libraries Yes Yes No No No
Outdated Library Yes No Yes Yes No
Unnecessary Permissions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak Crypto Algorithm Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Unauthorised Intent Receipt Yes No No Yes Yes
Unconstrained Inter-Component Communication Yes No No Yes Yes
Exposed adb-level Capabilities Yes No No Yes Yes
Debuggable Release Yes No No Yes No
Sensitive Data Exposure Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Insecure Network Protocol Yes No No Yes Yes
Exposed Credentials Yes No Yes Yes Yes
XSS-like Code Injection Yes No No No Yes
Dynamic Code Loading Yes No No Yes No
SQL Injection Yes No Yes No Yes










Framing of the Work
This chapter introduces some important concepts related to Android applications and
obfuscation. We also make an introduction on the Aptoide app store and its app valida-
tion system. Since this app store is the context of our dissertation, we will also provide a
description of its problem and goals.
3.1 Android Basics
Android is an open source platform based on Linux, consisting essentially of operating
system and middleware, a software structure that manages the functionality of the device
and integrates a set of APIs (Application Programming Interface) that allow the devel-
opment of applications and the interface with the user, developed primarily for mobile
platforms such as smart phones and tablets [Col+11; Mei08].
All Android applications run through the Dalvik VM (Virtual Machine). Although it
is a virtual machine that allows to execute applications developed in Java, this one is not
truly a virtual machine of Java and has some differences. The Dalvik VM runs only Java
files after they have been compiled in its own format (.dex - Dalvik executable) and has
been specially developed so that executions of multiple instances of this virtual machine
are possible [KM12].
Android applications have multiple entry points. They can rather use parts of other
Android applications on-demand and can require their services by calling their event
handlers, directly or through the operating system. In particular, Android applications
contain activities (code interacting with the user through a visual interface), services
(background operations with no interaction with the user), content providers (data con-
tainers such as databases) and broadcast receivers (objects reacting to broadcast messages).
These Android application are installed in the form of application package files and
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commonly known as APK (Android Package) files, which is, basically a zip compressed
archive. APK files are container files that contain both Application code, resources as
well as the application manifest file [Sch+16].
3.2 Obfuscation
During the development of an Android application the developer may choose to protect
his intellectual property by using obfuscation techniques in his code. For instance, some
companies may decide to obfuscate the application code as a post-processing step to
the class file generation, so as to make reverse-engineering an application difficult or
impossible. This decisions poses as a double-edged sword by the security community.
To a legitimate software company, obfuscation keeps its competitors away from copying
the code and quickly building their own products in an unfair way. To a malware au-
thor, obfuscation raises the bar for automated code analysis and manual investigation
[Don+18].
In general, obfuscation attempts to garble a program and makes the source or machine
code more difficult for humans to understand. Programmers can deliberately obfuscate
code to conceal its purpose or logic, in order to prevent tampering or deter reverse engi-
neering.There are several common obfuscation techniques used by Android applications,
including identifier renaming, string encryption, excessive overloading, reflection, and
so forth [Don+18].
3.3 Aptoide App Store
Founded in 2011, Aptoide is an Android app store with over 200 million users and
1 million applications that has partnerships with more than 15 thousand developers
(numbers of 2017). In 2018, Aptoide is receiving over 15 thousand applications per
day (new applications or new versions), which need to be tested in order to assure the
quality of service and the security of the users. It is an alternative marketplace for mobile
applications which runs on the Android operating system and according to a study on
security management of global third-party Android marketplaces [Ish+17], is one of the
safest. In Aptoide there is not a unique and centralised store but each user manages their
own store. This means that any user can create and manage its own app store, not being
necessarily a developer.
When an application is submitted to Aptoide, it needs to pass on two testing processes
to be available for consumers: the Aptoide Sentinel and the Fake Detector (see Figure
3.1). Sentinel emerged as a system to automatically detect malicious software, PUAs
(Potentially Unwanted Applications) and aggressive adware libraries [Pir]. Each uploaded
application goes through a verification process composed by 8 antiviruses. Given that this
system is in continuous upgrade and improvement (antivirus updates or more antivirus
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added to the process), the apps already on the repository are periodically re-tested to
assure the users protection to recently discovered threats.
The Fake Detector is a tool that automatically detect fake apps, like apps that have
just ads. It is based on rules or heuristics detected by Aptoide’s QA team, whose pattern is
modelled to automatically block apps that not being malicious, are not offering genuine
functionalities to users. The fake detector is also a process in development, so if there are
any new faulty patterns those will be added to the process. This ensures that the process
will always be updated and prepared for new known threats.
Figure 3.1: Aptoides’ validation process [Ico; Teca]
3.4 Problem
Even if Aptoides’ validation process protects the app store against known malware, there
is so little it can do about uploaded applications containing bad engineering choices. Like
applications that are a vulnerability due to development mistakes, e.g. SSL vulnerabilities
that allow criminals to access credit card numbers. These applications are then analysed
by the quality assurance (QA) team if an application receives bad user feedback. In
Aptoide an user is allowed to give feedback to an application by raising a flag. The flag
system is constituted by 5 types of flag: good, needs a license, fake, freeze and virus.
However, there was in average around 1753 negative user feedbacks per day between
2016 and 2018, and since the QA team workload is ordered by a FIFO policy, where apps
with recent feedbacks appear in first place to be reviewed, this huge amount of feedback
increases the QA team backlog and does not provide them an effective work methodology.
It is also important to point out that most of the negative user feedback is not accurate
(e.g. a user can make a complaint about the result of a game and give an unsatisfactory
feedback with no regard for the feedback system implemented), which results in a waste
of time when the applications analysed by a QA member are good instead of bad.
Despite the best efforts of Aptoide app store, the existing security and privacy guaran-
tees are still not enough. The lack of an automated approach to check for these security
vulnerabilities and the growing QA workload are two of the reasons that makes it neces-
sary to develop an automatic approach that can detect vulnerabilities in the submitted
applications even after they passed all the Aptoides’ validation system.
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3.5 Goal
In order to respond to the problem and the context of Aptoide, previously presented,
the proposed solution will be modelled as to serve as a decision support to the QA team.
It will automatically analyse an application for security vulnerabilities that would most
likely put at risk the security of both the user and marketplace. Combining that analysis
with the users feedback the solution will provide a prioritised APK list. Thus the time
spent manually reviewing apps with some bad feedback would be better used since the
ones with a higher threat level would be reviewed first instead of others that represent a
lesser threat. This combination can be rather challenging since the user feedback tends
to not be accurate, however the users’ feedback can also help us surpass the challenges
posed by code obfuscation and to better target the moving threats.
It is important to notice that the applications that will go through this solution were
already checked for virus and for common malicious patterns. Hence the solution will
not have the power to exclude an uploaded APK based only by the issues it might find,
nor will it replace the existing validation processes. Moreover, this solution depends on
the validation made by the two main processes, the Sentinel and the Fake Detector (if
any of these validation processes finds any threat on an uploaded application, then that










Implementation of the Solution
This chapter presents the implementation main ideas that were considered, followed by
the description of the modules’ architecture and information about the technologies used
in the development of the module that allows an automatic validation of applications.
4.1 Main Ideas
To achieve our goal, we propose a module to integrate in the Aptoides’ system and check
automatically APKs for infractions that could put at risk the security of both the user and
marketplace.
This module is supported by our selected static analysis tools and work as a decision
support for the QA team. The support is given trough a prioritised collection of APKs,
made according to the analysis of the static analysis tools and according to the users
feedback. The module will allow the members of the QA team to better manage their
time by manually reviewing the applications with more security vulnerabilities.
4.2 Architecture of the Solution
In order to better visualise our goal we have designed and followed the architecture shown
in Figure 4.1.
The first thing we would like to point out from the architecture is that our system
will not interfere with the already used and operable Aptoides validation system. In fact,
our proposed module will depend on the validation made by the two main processes, the
Sentinel and the Fake Detector: if they find a virus on an APK or a malicious pattern, the
module will not even process that APK. We also have chosen to follow a modular design






































Figure 4.1: Proposed architecture for the module [Ico; Teca]
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4.3 App Threat Analysis Module
In order to have a clear understanding of the module and how it works, we will describe
the process that an APK goes trough as well as the response of the module when a user
uploads an APK that is validated. As Figure 4.1 shows there are 5 stages of operations in
the implementation of the module:
• Retrieving APKs
First, the module will extract the uploaded APKs that already went through the
validation process, as the architecture shows. These APKs will be fetched from the
point where they are available in the app store. For this part, it was necessary to
resort to the Aptoide’s API.
• APK Analysis
After retrieving the APKs we will submit them to the analysis of each one of the five
selected static analyse tools. Despite this process being represented as a parallel
execution, we have tested the modules performance against the two methodologies:
sequence and parallel. More details about this option are displayed on the results.
• Results Normalisation
Once the analysis is complete, we will have 5 different results that will need to be
normalised so we can have some quantifiable results. Each tool has already a system
to quantify the severity of each problem found:
– AndroBugs
The AndroBugs tool has a severity system of 4 levels (Critical, Warning, Notice
and Info).
– Evicheck
This tool is the only one with a binary severity system, which means that or
there is a problem or there is not.
– MOBSF
The MobSF tool has a severity system of 4 levels (High, Warning, Info and
Good).
– Qark
Qark has a severity system of 4 levels (Vulnerability, Warning, Error and Info).
– Super
Super has a severity system of 5 levels (Critical, High, Warning, Medium and
Low).
Since all tools have different severity rating systems, to better comprehend the
results we took those systems, and we made an unique correspondent one capable
of including all of them. We have transformed those rating systems into one that
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could only have values between 0 and 1 (where 0 is not a threat and 1 is a threat).
We took the severity of each problem found by these tools and we have associated it
to a normalised result. Hence, instead of getting words as the quantifiable variable
of the problem we gave it a value:
– AndroBugs
The corresponding severity system of 4 levels (Critical=4/4;
Warning=3/4; Notice=2/4 and Info=1/4).
– Evicheck
The corresponding severity system of 2 levels (True=1; False=0).
– MOBSF
The corresponding severity system of 4 levels (High=4/4; Warning=3/4;
Info=2/4 and Good=1/4).
– Qark
The corresponding severity system of 4 levels (Vulnerability=4/4;
Warning=3/4; Error=2/4 and Info=1/4).
– Super
The corresponding severity system of 5 levels (Critical=5/5; High=4/5; Warn-
ing=3/5; Medium=2/5; and Low=1/5).
• APK Threat Categorisation
The APK threat categorisation combines (a) the normalised results of the static
analysis tools with (b) the users’ feedback. During this dissertation we have given
value to the users’ feedback, since it could be a means to the detection and response
to attacks not blocked by app stores. Hence, helping our solution block the moving
target nature of the threats made on the mobile security arena and to overcome the
considerable challenges that outcomes from the high volume of apps received on
the app stores.
Thus the users’ feedback is important for this categorisation given the motives
previously mentioned. However, since frequently the users’ feedback is not accurate,
we propose to combine the results of static analysis tools with the users’ feedback.
The hypothesis we suggest is that if an APK has several severe problems reported by
the static analysis tools and there is a big quantity of negative user’s feedback, then
it is likely that the application is harmful to the consumers. Therefore, the quality
assurance team should be notified. In this hypothesis we take into consideration
not only the quantity of problems observed during the second stage of the process
(APK Analysis) but also the severity of the problems found. So we also added more
two variables into consideration: the quantity of user feedback that the analysed
APK has and the type of user feedback.
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As already explained, the Aptoide user feedback system has 5 types of flags: good,
needs a license, fake, freeze and virus. To each one of these types of flags we have
given a value comprehended in the set -1, 0, 1. So that we could quantify the type of
user feedback in our hypothesis. Hence, the flags that represent bad user feedback
(freeze, virus, fake) we have given a positive value (1); to the positive user feedback
(good) we have given a negative value (-1); and because we could not verify with
the selected tools the copyrights of the uploaded application, we had to give a null
value (0) to the flag entitled “needs license”.
Based on the related work there is still no well-accepted solution to the problem;
quoting from the paper Static Analysis of Android Apps: A Systematic Literature
Review [Li+17] “There is no single work that has been proposed to tackle all chal-
lenges of static analysis that are related to Android programming”. Therefore, we
proposed the following solution that we will validate using a sample of reviewed
APKs (a sample reviewed by the Aptoide’s quality assurance team and labelled as
“threat” or “not a threat”, given that “not a threat” applies to the applications that
passed their test and “threat” to the ones that did not).
To obtain the threat level of an APK, we decided to formulate three metrics that
would take into consideration all the variables mentioned in our hypotheses. Firstly,
we said we would take into consideration: (a) the quantity of problems observed
during the APK analysis and (b) the severity of the problems found. We have placed










W1 +W2 = 1 (4.2)
In Equation 4.1 we have taken our first variable, the quantity of problems (a), to
calculate the corresponding value of amount of problems directly proportional to
the maximum amount of problems found in all APKs analysed. With this we want to
see the proportion of problems of one APK when compared with the sample. Then
we took our second variable, the severity of the problems found (b), to calculate the
average of the severity of the problems found for the analysed APK.
The AmountOfProblems in the equation number 4.1 refers to the total amount of
problems found in the tools analysis for the analysed APK, as for the
Max(AmountOfProblems) it refers to the maximum total number of problems found
during the analysis of a set of APKs, at the moment of the analysis of the APK
currently reviewed. To each part of the equation we have assigned a weight (W1
and W2) and then added the two parts. We have assigned these weights in order
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to analyse the impact of each variable in the formulated equation and how the
variation of those variables can give us a better threat rating system.
After formulating the weighted result, we then devised the second formula taking
into account the other variables of our hypothesis. Thus we payed attention to: (c)
the quantity of user feedback that the analysed APK has and (d) the quantifiable










W3 +W4 = 1 (4.4)
In Equation 4.3 we took our first variable, the quantity of user feedback that the
analysed APK has (c), to calculate the corresponding value of user feedback directly
proportional to the maximum found in all APKs analysed. Since we wanted to use
these variables in a similar way, the Equation 4.3 is an analogous equation to the one
in 4.1. Hence the first part of the Equation 4.3 is meant to be used as a way to see the
proportion of user feedback of one APK when compared with the sample. Then we
took our second variable, the quantifiable type of user feedback (d), to calculate the
quantifiable average of the users’ feedback for the analysed APK (the quantifiable
type of user feedback was the result of the numeric system implemented, explained
above).
The AmountOfFlags in the Equation 4.3 refers to the total amount of flags for the
APK analysed, as for the Max(AmountOfFlags) refers to the maximum total number
of flags found during the analysis of a set of APKs, at the moment of the analysis
of the APK currently reviewed. To each part of the equation we assigned a weight
(W3 and W4) and then added the two parts.
Due to the appliance of our numeric system to the Aptoide user feedback system, if
we joined the two equations (4.1 and 4.3), we could reach negative values that would
be important to the determination of the threat level of an application. Hence our
last equation was nonetheless the junction result of the two equations:
T hreatLevel = WeightedResult ∗W5 +UserFeedback ∗W6 (4.5)
W5 +W6 = 1 (4.6)
During our tests we assigned multiple combinations to the weights. These values
were comprehended in the set 4.7. We decided to take a simplistic linear approach
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to the values given to the different weights between the 3 formulas as a way to better
understand our results.
W1,W2,W3,W4,W5,W6 ∈ [0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7] (4.7)
WeightedResult,UserFeedback,T hreatLevel ∈ [0,1] (4.8)
Our last equation (4.5) will be the one to define the priority of the APKs for the
manual inspection. And since the user feedback can have a negative value, the
weighted result calculated in Equation 4.1 may decrease, adjusting the threat level
according to the needs of the app store.
Despite the fact that the currently available flags do not focus in the report of pro-
gramming malpractices, we believe that the negative ones we take into account
(fake, freeze and virus) could detect problems that stemmed from the bad engineer-
ing decisions made by the developer.
• Threat Notification
After the module concludes the attribution of a threat level to an APK by the former
stage of this process, the module will give to the quality assurance team two forms of
decision support. First if an APK receives a threat level higher than a critical point,
e.g. over 80%, then the module sends an automatic e-mail to a member of the quality
assurance team. This e-mail gives the quality assurance team information about
the md5sum of the APK and the corresponding threat level, so that the manual
review can take place. Secondly, the module provides an automatic service to get
an ordered list of APKs by threat level.
In conclusion, we based the proposed decision support on an ordered list of APKs
and on notifications triggered by some conditions, for instance, when an APK gets
a high threat level.
4.4 Database Structure
As the architecture in section 4.2 shows, this module will fetch the APKs that already
went through the validation process and have bad user feedback. For that purpose we
created an isolated data base for testing and to guarantee the micro services ideology. We
made our database proposal considering the database used by the Aptoide micro services,







































Figure 4.2: Proposed entity–relationship model for the module
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The tables Flag, UserFeedback and APK were designed at the image of the original
ones. The content of the tables Tool, ToolProblem, Problem, ThreatLevel and Flag is
populated before the module can run:
• The Tool table is populated with the name of the tools that are used in the module;
• The Problem table is populated with the name and description of the security vul-
nerabilities we decided to analyse;
• The ToolProblem table is populated with the combinations between each tool and
the security vulnerabilities they can catch;
• The ThreatLevel table is populated with the minimum and maximum values of each
of the 10 threat levels;
• The Flag table is populated with the name and label of the five different types of
flag.
The table APK stores information about the already validated APKs that have user
feedback. In this table we store the name, package, version code and md5sum of the
application and where it is stored and its download link. The table UserFeedback stores
each entry of user feedback made to an application (recognised by its md5sum).
The tables ResultsTool, ResultsSummary, ResultsAPK and QAPriorities store the re-
sults of the analysis made to the applications and the outcome of that analysis:
• The ResultsTool table stores the amount of problems discovered by a certain tool
during the analysis of a specific APK. It also stores the time it took to the tool to
make that analysis.
• The ResultsSummary table stores a summary of the information retrieved from the
analysis of a specific APK as well as when it happened and how much time it took.
• The ResultsAPK table stores the type and the severity of each security vulnerability
found by each one of the 5 tools. It also stores the location of the output of the
analysis (the non-processed output given by each tool).
• The QAPriorities table stores the threat level of each application as well as the
information of if an APK was already reviewed.
Lastly, we have the UserFeedbackLogSniffer table, which stores the last entry of the
UserFeedback table that was analysed by the module.
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4.5 Used Technologies
To develop the solution, we used python as the programming language and used the
PyCharm Professional IDE [Jet] as the tool to implement the module. We choose the
Pycharm IDE not only because it offers multiple features (access the command line, con-
nection to a database, it creates a virtual environment, and it manages the version control
system all in one place) but also because this project was made from scratch.
We used MySQL together with peewee to implement the database structure described
in section 4.4. Peewee is an ORM (Object Relational Mapping) written in python that
provides a lightweight querying interface over SQL [Lei]. An ORM is a mechanism that
makes it possible to address access and manipulate objects without having to consider
how those objects relate to their data sources [Rou]; it makes data access more abstract
and portable.
To retrieve the order APK list by threat level, we used Flask as the webservice. Flask
is a web framework that provides tools, libraries and technologies that allow us to build a
web application. Since it is a micro-framework it has little to no dependencies to external
libraries, which makes it a light framework to use [Das].
The e-mail notifications sent from the module to the quality assurance team, about












This chapter presents a set of test cases with the purpose of evaluate the functionality
of the module as well as the evaluation of the previously defined metrics. To test the
functionality of the module we started by defining use cases to ensure that the delivered
software works properly. We performed three tests entitled “Sequential and Parallel Pro-
cessing” (section 5.1), “Module Tools Composition” (see section 5.2), “Modules Accuracy”
(see section 5.3) and “Metrics Results” (see section 5.4).
5.1 Sequential and Parallel Processing
The performance of the module was tested by examining the modules execution time.
To test the execution time, we gather 100 APKs from the Aptoides’ repository and used
two use cases (see subsection 5.1.2 and subsection 5.1.3) . The sample used for these
two test cases is called Sample_1. The test case procedure we followed is represented in
subsection 5.1.1.
We compared the modules results for the execution time between a sequential and a
parallel composition of the tools, in order to understand how great was the time difference
between the two of them (subsection 5.1.4). Since our results showed us that the time
difference was only of 19%, we then proceeded to an analysis of the composition of the
tools.
5.1.1 Test Case Procedure
In this section we present the test case model we followed to test the analysis time of the
module. We had two scenarios: executing the module with the tools running in sequence
Figure 5.1a and executing the module with the tools running in parallel Figure 5.1b.
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However, the procedure and expected output of the test case were the same for both
scenarios.
(a) Scenario 1 - Se-
quential
(b) Scenario 2 - Parallel
Figure 5.1: Scenarios to test the analysis time of the module [Ico; Teca]
Test case procedure
1. Use Sample_1 as as input for the module.
Expected Output
After the execution of the module there should be:
• 100 new rows in table UserFeedback with feedback information about 100 different
APKs;
• 100 new rows in table APK with resumed information about the APK;
• 100 new rows in table ResultsSummary with the resumed information of the analy-
sis;
• One row in table ResultsTool for each tool that analysed an APK with the time it
took to analyse it;
• One row for each problem found per APK in ResultsAPK;
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• 100 new rows in table QAPriorities, where each row contains a threat level associ-
ated with one APK;
• One row in UserFeedbackSniffer with information about the last row id seen in the
UserFeedback table.
5.1.2 Measurement of the analysis time with a sequential composition of
the tools
For this test the goal is to understand how much time does the module takes to analyse
100 APKS, as well as how much time it takes for each tool to analyse an APK, given that
the tools will be operating sequentially.
After processing this test use case, we confirmed the expected outcome and we anal-
ysed the total time of the analysis of each analysed APK. The graphic in Figure 5.2 gives
the execution time in minutes for each analysed APK. From the graphic we concluded
that the total time of the analysis of the 100 APKs from the Sample_1 was of 20 hours
and 45 minutes. Wherein, the average time of the analysis of one APK, by all tools of the
module running in sequence, was of 12 minutes and 26 seconds.
Figure 5.2: Graphic of the time analysis per APK with a sequential composition of the
tools
5.1.3 Measurement of the analysis time with a parallel composition of the
tools
For this test the goal is to understand how much time does the module takes to analyse
100 APKS, as well as how much time it takes for each tool to analyse an APK, given that
the tools will be operating in parallel.
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After processing this test use case, we also have confirmed the expected outcome and
we analysed the total time of the analysis of each analysed APK. The graphic in Figure 5.3
gives the execution time in minutes for each analysed APK when the tools are executed in
parallel. From the graphic we concluded that total time of the analysis of the 100 APKs
from the Sample_1 was of 16 hours and 47 minutes. Wherein, the average time of the
analysis of one APK, by all tools of the module running in parallel, was of 10 minutes
and 4 seconds.
Figure 5.3: Graphic of the time analysis per APK with a parallel composition of the tools
By comparing the result of the two test use cases (subsection 5.1.2 and subsection 5.1.3)
as the graphic in Figure 5.3 shows, we were able to conclude that the difference between
a parallel and sequential execution of the tools in the module was only of 3 hours and
57 minutes, for the total analysis of the 100 APKs of the Sample_1. Which represents an
average of less 2 minutes and 22 seconds per analysis.
Table 5.1 give us a summary of the total analysis time for each scenario and the
average time per APK. We can see that the difference between the two scenarios for the
total analysis time was of 3 hours and 58 minutes, wherein the average time per APK was
of 2 minutes and 22 seconds. This represents a time difference of only 19%.
Scenario Total time Average time per APK
Scenario 1 (5.1.2) 20h 45m 12m 26s
Scenario 2 (5.1.3) 16h 47m 10m 4s
The Difference 3h 58m 2m 22s
Table 5.1: Summary of the analysis time between the two scenarios
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Figure 5.4: Graphic of the time analysis per APK comparing a parallel and sequential
composition of the tools
5.1.4 Discussion of the Results
In addition to presenting the results obtained, it becomes necessary to discuss them. This
discussion is made for the analysis time, taking into account the results obtained in each
one of the use cases. Since this module would be part of the Aptoide’s system it became
crucial that the analysis time per APK was as less as possible.
Regarding the analysis time, and taking into account the results obtained for the two
test use cases (subsection 5.1.2 and subsection 5.1.3), it was observed that:
• The analysis time is less when the tools run in parallel;
• The difference between an architecture in parallel and in sequence is not as great as
it should be. The difference in the total time analysis between the two is of 3 hours
and 57 minutes (which represents a difference of 19%).
Despite the fact that the analysis time difference between the two types of architecture
is not much, we have decided to choose the architecture in parallel. We made this choice
to comply with the aim of reducing the time of the analysis. However, and with that goal
in mind, we still needed to make more tests to understand what was behind the increase
of the analysis time. So we decided to make another test but this time with a parallel
architecture of the tools and comparing the time of an analysis with all the tools and an
analysis without the slower tool.
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Figure 5.5: Analysis time of an APK distributed by the tools
To determine which tool was the slowest tool, we took a look at the APK analysis time
distributed by each tool (see Figure 5.5) and we concluded that Qark was the one taking
the most of the analysis time. In fact, according to Figure 5.6, Qark took 64% of the total
analysis time.
Figure 5.6: The percentage of the total time distributed by each tool of the module, after
the analysis of Sample_1
Hence, after these results we decided to make more tests: one running an APK sample
in a parallel architecture with all the tools and another where we remove Qark. However,
these tests would only serve as a response to the question “Can we make a faster analysis?”.
We also have to take into account if removing Qark would affect our main purpose, that
is, the rating of the threat level system.
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5.2 Module Tools Composition
To test the module tools composition, we have compared the execution time for a parallel
analysis with all tools (see subsection 5.2.2) and removing the slower tool (see subsec-
tion 5.2.3). To test these two use cases, we gathered another sample, Sample_2, of 100
APKs from the Aptoides’ back-office of the members of the quality assurance team. This
back-office contains all the APKs in need of a manual review and the ones that were al-
ready reviewed by the QA team. In the collected sample we have 50 APKs that passed
the quality assurance team, thus labelled as “not a threat”, and 50 APKs that failed the
quality assurance manual analysis (labelled as “a threat”). The purpose of this selection
will be explained in section 5.3.
The results for the module tools composition test, made us believe that removing
Qark would be a viable choice, since the time difference between an execution with all
tools and removing Qark was about 55% less. However, we could not make this decision
based only in the execution time, so we proceeded to test the accuracy of the module.
5.2.1 Test Case Procedure
In this section we present the test case model we followed to test the parallel composition
of the tools in the module. We had two scenarios: executing the module with all tools
running in parallel Figure 5.7a and executing the module after removing the slower tool
and running in parallel Figure 5.7b. However, the procedure and expected output of the
test case were the same for both scenarios.
(a) Scenario 1 - All tools (b) Scenario 2 - Slowest tool removed




1. Use Sample_2 as as input for the module.
Expected Output
After the execution of the module there should be:
• 100 new rows in table UserFeedback with feedback information about 100 different
APKs;
• 100 new rows in table APK with resumed information about the APK;
• 100 new rows in table ResultsSummary with the resumed information of the analy-
sis;
• One row in table ResultsTool for each tool that analysed an APK with the time it
took to analyse it;
• One row for each problem found per APK in ResultsAPK;
• 100 new rows in table QAPriorities, where each row contains a threat level associ-
ated with one APK;
• One row in UserFeedbackSniffer with information about the last row id seen in the
UserFeedback table.
5.2.2 Measurement of the analysis time with a parallel composition of all
tools
For this test the goal is to understand how much time does the module takes to analyse
100 APKS, as well as how much time it takes for each tool to analyse an APK, given that
the tools will be operating parallel.
After processing this test use case, we confirmed the expected outcome, and we anal-
ysed the total time of the analysis of each analysed APK. The graphic in Figure 5.8 gives
the execution time in minutes for each analysed APK. From the graphic we concluded
that the total time of the analysis of the 100 APKs from the Sample_2 was of 14 hours
and 36 minutes. Wherein, the average time of the analysis of one APK, by all tools of the
module running in parallel, was of 8 minutes and 51 seconds.
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Figure 5.8: Graphic of the analysis time of the Sample_2, with a parallel composition of
all tools
5.2.3 Measurement of the analysis time with a parallel composition, when
removing Qark
For this test the goal is to understand how much time does the module takes to analyse
100 APKS, as well as how much time it takes for each tool to analyse an APK, given that
the tools will be operating parallel and Qark is removed from the group of tools.
After processing this test use case, we confirmed the expected outcome and we anal-
ysed the total time of the analysis of each analysed APK. The graphic in Figure 5.9 gives
the execution time in minutes for each analysed APK. From the graphic we concluded
that the total time of the analysis of the 100 APKs from the Sample_2 was of 6 hours and
3 minutes. Wherein, the average time of the analysis of one APK, by all tools except Qark
running in parallel, was of 3 minutes and 40 seconds.
Figure 5.9: Graphic of the analysis time of the Sample_2, with a parallel composition the
tools when removing Qark
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By comparing the result of the two test use cases (subsection 5.2.2 and subsection 5.2.3)
as the graphic in Figure 5.10 shows, we were able to conclude that the difference between
a parallel execution with all tools and removing the slower tool was of 8 hours and 33
minutes, for the total analysis of the 100 APKs of the Sample_2. Which represents an
average of less 5 minutes and 11 seconds per analysis.
Figure 5.10: Graphic of the analysis time of the Sample_2, comparing the scenario with
all tools and removing Qark
Table 5.2 give us a summary of the total analysis time for each scenario and the average
time per APK. We can see that in the scenario where all tools are used the analysis time
of the module is bigger by 59% then the scenario where the slowest tool is removed. This
means that our module became 59% faster by removing the slowest tool.
Scenario Total time Average time per APK
Scenario 1 (5.2.2) 14h 36m 8m 51s
Scenario 2 (5.2.3) 6h 3m 3m 40s
The Difference 8h 33m 5m 11s
Table 5.2: Summary of the analysis time between the two scenarios
5.2.4 Discussion of the Results
After the tests we observed that Qark, in most cases, was the tool that took about 80% of
the analysis time. So we contacted the developers, and we were informed that we were
most likely to see a lot worse performance on obfuscated code. Even if there should be
no infinite loops, it would take a long time to run due to the increased amount of files
and code in general. And as the Figure 5.10 shows, this time the difference between the
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two test cases was considerable. As we can see, there was a significant time reduction.
The removal of the slowest tool, made it possible to analyse one APK in approximately 4
minutes in average (less 59%). Even if this removal made our solution more viable, we
still needed to asses the accuracy of the module so this change would not compromise
our goals.
5.3 Modules Accuracy
In order to understand if the decision of removing Qark was a viable choice we made a
comparison based on how close is our threat level rating system to the accepted value.
This is a measurement that requires accuracy. According to ISO 5725-1 [Iso], the general
term accuracy is used to describe the closeness of a measurement to the true value.
In our context, the true value is if the analysed APK is a threat. For our threat level
system to be accurate it would have to mean that it can identify properly the APKs that
are a threat. For example, if we had 2 APKs, A and B, and if A is a threat but not B, then
our module would have to give a higher threat level to A and a lower one to B.
To test the modules accuracy we used our Sample_2 since it was already manually
reviewed by the quality assurance team. In that sample we have 50 APKs that passed the
quality assurance team test, thus they were labelled as “not a threat”. Since the other half
of the sample failed the quality assurance manual analysis, this half was labelled as “a
threat”.
However, our threat rating system assigns a threat level between 0 and 1, which we
then extend to a 1 to 10 scale. This means that to assess the accuracy we will have to
look at the distribution of the APKs along that scale and compare them to the real labels.
Since we have 50 APKs labelled as “a threat” and 50 APKs labelled as “not a threat”, we
have considered that in the perfect scenario the prioritised threat level list should have
at the highest threat levels the 50 APKs labelled as “a threat”, and only then the other
50 APKs labelled as “not a threat”. In our proposal, the perfect scenario represents an
accuracy of 100%. Wherein to calculate the accuracy of other scenarios we would just
have to calculate the directly proportional quantity from the perfect scenario. Table 5.3
shows the scenario where the accuracy is of 100%, for 100 APKs.
Label Top of the threat level list Bottom of the threat level list
Not a threat 0 50
Threat 50 0
Table 5.3: Scenario for a 100% accuracy
In Table 5.4 we show an example of a scenario where the first 50 APKs of the priori-
tised list of APKs (ordered by threat level) consists of 10 APKs labelled as “not a threat”
and 40 labelled as “a threat”. In this scenario, the accuracy is of 80%.
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Label Top of the threat level list Bottom of the threat level list
Not a threat 10 40
Threat 40 10
Table 5.4: Scenario for a 80% accuracy
For these tests (subsection 5.3.1 and subsection 5.3.2) the goal is to compare the ac-
curacy between a parallel analysis with all tools and removing the slower tool. Despite
all metrics have weights, in these tests we will focus in the weight variation of the equa-
tions: weighted result and threat level. We have chosen to do it so because the decision
of removing a tool needs a study on the effect of the decreasing of the problems found.
Thus, in these tests we will use the five weight variations for the weighted result
equation. We used the follow combination pairs: (0,3; 0,7), (0,4; 0,6), (0,5; 0,5), (0,6; 0,4)
and (0,7; 0,3) to the weights W1 and W2 of the weighted result equation. To understand
the impact of removing a tool from the module, we have chosen to maximise the impact of
the problems found (the result of the weighted result). Hence, in the threat level equation
the weights W5 and W6 will have the following pair: (0,7; 0,3). To the user feedback
equation we gave the same weight value to both weights, (0,5;0,5). Table 5.5 shows a
summary of the combinations to be assessed by the tests.
Weighted Result Equation User Feedback Equation Threat Level Equation
W1=0,3 and W2=0,7 W3=0,5 and W4=0,5 W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
W1=0,4 and W2=0,6 W3=0,5 and W4=0,5 W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
W1=0,5 and W2=0,5 W3=0,5 and W4=0,5 W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
W1=0,6 and W2=0,4 W3=0,5 and W4=0,5 W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
W1=0,7 and W2=0,3 W3=0,5 and W4=0,5 W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
Table 5.5: Weight combinations for the test cases
The subsection 5.3.1 is composed by the results of the 5 test cases presented in the
table above, for the scenario where all tools are used (see subsections: 5.3.1.1, 5.3.1.2,
5.3.1.3, 5.3.1.4 and 5.3.1.5). For each test, there is a graphic and a detailed analysis of the
results.
In subsection 5.3.2 there are also the results of the 5 test cases presented in the table
above for the scenario where Qark is removed from the module (see subsections: 5.3.2.1,
5.3.2.2, 5.3.2.3, 5.3.2.4 and 5.3.2.5). For each test, there is a graphic and a detailed analysis
of the results.
After we observed the results from subsection 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, we made a comparative
analysis between each combination of the table 5.5. In subsection 5.3.3 is presented the




In conclusion, after observing the results, we removed Qark from the set of tools be-
cause the solution does not lose accuracy and because the tool does not support obfuscated
code.
5.3.1 Evaluation of the accuracy of the module, when using all tools
Test case description
The goal is to evaluate the accuracy of the module, following the conditions explained
above and using all the tools in the module.
Test case procedure
1. Use Sample_2 as as input for the module.
2. Assess the module accuracy for all the weight variables (see Table 5.5)
5.3.1.1 Modules accuracy for W1=0,3 and W2=0,7; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.11: Threat prioritisation with all tools, for W1=0,3 and W2=0,7; W3=0,5 and
W4=0,5; W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
Looking at the graphic, we can conclude that the APKs labelled as a “threat” are
distributed across the 3 highest threat levels (levels 5, 6 and 7). The total number of APKs
in these 3 levels is of 55. Of those 55 APKs, 34 are labelled as a “threat” and the others
21 as “not a threat”. This means that the module was able to identify 68% (34/50) of the
total amount of APKs labelled as a threat. We can also conclude that for the two highest
threat levels, 7 and 6, the solution erroneously tags 8% of the labelled “not a threat”
APKs as “a threat” (1 out of 13).
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The other threat levels (levels 3 and 4), count on 45 APKs: 29 labelled as not a “threat”
and 16 as “a threat”. Which means that the module was able to identify 58% (29/50) of
the total amount of APKs labelled as not a threat. In the second lowest threat level (4)
there are 44 APKs, of which 16 are labelled as a threat and 28 are labelled as not a threat.
This means for the APKs scored in threat level 4 the module erroneously tags 36% of the
labelled “threat” APKs as “not a threat” (16 out of 44).
5.3.1.2 Modules accuracy for W1=0,4 and W2=0,6; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.12: Threat prioritisation with all tools, for W1=0,4 and W2=0,6; W3=0,5 and
W4=0,5; W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
After the analysis of the Figure 5.12, it is concluded that the APKs labelled as a “threat”
are distributed across the 3 highest threat levels (levels 5, 6 and 7). The total number of
APKs in these 3 levels is of 42. Of those 42 APKs, 28 are labelled as a “threat” and the
others 14 as “not a threat”. This means that the module was able to identify 56% (28/50)
of the total amount of APKs labelled as a threat. We can also conclude that for the two
highest threat levels, 7 and 6, the solution erroneously tags 11% of the labelled “not a
threat” APKs as “a threat” (1 out of 9).
The other threat levels (levels 3 and 4), count on 58 APKs: 22 labelled as a “threat”
and 36 as “not a threat”. Which means that the module was able to identify 72% (36/50)
of the total amount of APKs labelled as not a threat. In the second lowest threat level (4)
there are 49 APKs, of which 19 are labelled as a threat and 30 are labelled as not a threat.
This means that for the APKs scored in threat level 4 the module erroneously tags 39%
of the labelled “threat” APKs as “not a threat” (19 out of 49).
In the lowest threat level, the level 3, there are 9 APKs, of which 6 are labelled as not
a threat and 3 are labelled as a threat. For the APKs scored in threat level 3, our solution
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erroneously tags 50% of the labelled “threat” APKs as “not a threat” (3 out of 6).
5.3.1.3 Modules accuracy for W1=0,5 and W2=0,5; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.13: Threat prioritisation with all tools, for W1=0,5 and W2=0,5; W3=0,5 and
W4=0,5; W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
Looking at Figure 5.13, we can conclude that the APKs labelled as a “threat” are
distributed across the two medium threat levels (levels 4 and 5). However, taking a closer
look at threat level 4, the solution gave us 24 APKs labelled as a threat and 25 APKs
labelled as not a threat. Since the amount of APKs labelled as a threat is almost the same
as the ones labelled as not a threat, we can only conclude that the solution had no relevant
accuracy for this intermediate threat level.
In the highest threat levels (levels 6 and 7) we have a total amount of 4 APKs labelled
as a threat. This means that the module assigned the highest threat levels to 8% of the
total 50 labelled threat APKs. For threat level 5, the module assigned 15 APKs labelled as
a threat and 10 APKs labelled as not a threat. This means, that for this level, the solution
erroneously tags 40% of the labelled “not a threat” APKs as “a threat” (10 out of 25).
The lowest threat levels (levels 2 and 3), counts on 22 APKs: 7 labelled as a “threat”
and 15 as “not a threat”. Which means that the module was able to identify 30% (15/50)
of the total amount of APKs labelled as not a threat. In the second lowest threat level (3)
there are 21 APKs, of which 7 are labelled as a threat and 14 are labelled as not a threat.
This means that for the APKs scored in threat level 4 the module erroneously tags 33%
of the labelled “threat” APKs as “not a threat” (7 out of 21).
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5.3.1.4 Modules accuracy for W1=0,6 and W2=0,4; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.14: Threat prioritisation with all tools, for W1=0,6 and W2=0,4; W3=0,5 and
W4=0,5; W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
Figure 5.14 show us that the majority of the labelled threat and not a threat APKs are
distributed in threat levels 3 and 4. In both levels the predominant APKs are the ones
labelled as not a threat. In level 4 there are 38 APKs: 22 labelled as not a threat and 16
labelled as a threat. This means that our solution attributed a threat level of 4 to 32% of
the labelled as a threat APKs and to 44% of the not a threat APKs. For threat level 3, there
are 40 APKs: 21 labelled as not a threat (42% of the total amount of the APKs labelled as
not a threat) and 19 labelled as a threat (38% of the total amount of the APKs labelled as
a threat). Since only in these two threat levels, 3 and 4, the solution tags 70% of the APKs
labelled as a threat and 86% of the APKs labelled as not a threat, we can conclude that
the solution had no relevant accuracy for this intermediate threat levels.
In the highest threat levels (levels 6 and 7) we have a total amount of 5 APKs labelled
as a threat. This means that the module assigned the highest threat levels to 10% of the
total 50 labelled threat APKs. For threat level 5, the module assigned 8 APKs labelled as
a threat and 3 APKs labelled as not a threat. This means, that for this level, the solution
erroneously tags 27% of the labelled “not a threat” APKs as “a threat” (3 out of 11).
The lowest threat level (level 2), counts on 6 APKs: 2 labelled as a “threat” and 4 as
“not a threat”. Which means that the module was able to identify 8% (4/50) of the total
amount of APKs labelled as not a threat and for the APKs scored in threat level 2 the
module erroneously tags 33% of the labelled “threat” APKs as “not a threat” (2 out of 6).
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5.3.1.5 Modules accuracy for W1=0,7 and W2=0,3; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.15: Threat prioritisation with all tools, for W1=0,7 and W2=0,3; W3=0,5 and
W4=0,5; W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
In Figure 5.15 we can see that the majority of the labelled threat and not a threat APKs
are distributed in threat levels 3 and 4. In level 4 there are 33 APKs: 22 labelled as not a
threat and 11 labelled as a threat. This means that our solution attributed a threat level
of 4 to 22% of the labelled as a threat APKs and to 44% of the not a threat APKs. For
threat level 3, there are 39 APKs: 18 labelled as not a threat (36% of the total amount of
the APKs labelled as not a threat) and 21 labelled as a threat (42% of the total amount of
the APKs labelled as a threat). Since only in these two threat levels, 3 and 4, the solution
tags 64% of the APKs labelled as a threat and 80% of the APKs labelled as not a threat,
we can conclude that the solution had no relevant accuracy for this intermediate threat
levels.
In the highest threat levels (levels 6 and 7) we have a total amount of 5 APKs labelled
as a threat. This means that the module assigned the highest threat levels to 10% of the
total 50 labelled threat APKs. For threat level 5, the module assigned 5 APKs labelled as
a threat and 2 APKs labelled as not a threat. This means, that for this level, the solution
erroneously tags 29% of the labelled “not a threat” APKs as “a threat” (2 out of 7).
The lowest threat level (levels 2), counts on 16 APKs: 8 labelled as a “threat” and 8
as “not a threat”. Which means that the module was able to identify 16% (8/50) of the
total amount of APKs labelled as not a threat. However it also identified 16% (8/50) of
the total amount of APKs labelled as a threat.
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5.3.2 Evaluation of the accuracy of the module, when removing Qark
Test case description
The goal is to evaluate the accuracy of the module, following the conditions explained
above and removing Qark from the tools.
Test case procedure
1. Use Sample_2 as as input for the module.
2. Assess the module accuracy for all the weight variables (see Table 5.5)
5.3.2.1 Modules accuracy for W1=0,3 and W2=0,7; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.16: Threat prioritisation removing Qark, for W1=0,3 and W2=0,7; W3=0,5 and
W4=0,5; W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
Looking at the graphic, we can conclude that the APKs labelled as a “threat” are
distributed across the 3 highest threat levels (levels 5, 6 and 7). The total number of APKs
in these 3 levels is of 68. Of those 68 APKs, 40 are labelled as a “threat” and the others
28 as “not a threat”. This means that the module was able to identify 80% (40/50) of the
total amount of APKs labelled as a threat. We can also conclude that for the two highest
threat levels, 7 and 6, the solution erroneously tags 11% of the labelled “not a threat”
APKs as “a threat” (2 out of 19).
The other threat levels (levels 3 and 4), count on 32 APKs: 10 labelled as a “threat”
and 22 as “not a threat”. Which means that the module was able to identify 44% (22/50)
of the total amount of APKs labelled as not a threat. In the second lowest threat level (4)
there are 31 APKs, of which 10 are labelled as a threat and 21 are labelled as not a threat.
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This means for the APKs scored in threat level 4 the module erroneously tags 48% of the
labelled “threat” APKs as “not a threat” (10 out of 21).
5.3.2.2 Modules accuracy for W1=0,4 and W2=0,6; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.17: Threat prioritisation removing Qark, for W1=0,4 and W2=0,6; W3=0,5 and
W4=0,5; W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
After the analysis of the Figure 5.17, it is concluded that the APKs labelled as a “threat”
are distributed across the 3 highest threat levels (levels 5, 6 and 7). The total number of
APKs in these 3 levels is of 52. Of those 52 APKs, 31 are labelled as a “threat” and the
others 21 as “not a threat”. This means that the module was able to identify 62% (31/50)
of the total amount of APKs labelled as a threat. We can also conclude that for the two
highest threat levels, 7 and 6, the solution erroneously tags 10% of the labelled “not a
threat” APKs as “a threat” (1 out of 10).
The other threat levels (levels 3 and 4), count on 48 APKs: 25 labelled as a “threat”
and 23 as “not a threat”. Which means that the module was able to identify 46% (23/50)
of the total amount of APKs labelled as not a threat. In the second lowest threat level (4)
there are 46 APKs, of which 24 are labelled as a threat and 22 are labelled as not a threat.
In the lowest threat level, the level 3, there are 2 APKs, of which one is labelled as a
threat and one is labelled as not a threat.
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5.3.2.3 Modules accuracy for W1=0,5 and W2=0,5; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.18: Threat prioritisation removing Qark, for W1=0,5 and W2=0,5; W3=0,5 and
W4=0,5; W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
Looking at Figure 5.18, we can conclude that the APKs labelled as a “threat” are
distributed across the two medium threat levels (levels 4 and 5). However, taking a closer
look at threat level 4, the solution gave us 23 APKs labelled as a threat and 25 APKs
labelled as not a threat. Since the amount of APKs labelled as a threat is almost the same
as the ones labelled as not a threat, we can only conclude that the solution had no relevant
accuracy for this intermediate threat level.
In the highest threat levels (levels 6 and 7) we have a total amount of 7 APKs labelled
as a threat. This means that the module assigned the highest threat levels to 14% of the
total 50 labelled threat APKs. For threat level 5, the module assigned 16 APKs labelled
as a threat and 17 APKs labelled as not a threat.
The lowest threat level (level 3), counts on 12 APKs: 4 labelled as a “threat” and 8 as
“not a threat”. Which means that the module was able to identify 16% (8/50) of the total
amount of APKs labelled as not a threat, and that for the APKs scored in threat level 3




5.3.2.4 Modules accuracy for W1=0,6 and W2=0,4; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.19: Threat prioritisation removing Qark, for W1=0,6 and W2=0,4; W3=0,5 and
W4=0,5; W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
Figure 5.19 show us that the majority of the APKs labelled as not a threat are in level
5. This threat level has a total of 65 APKs of the 100 analysed, there are 42 APKs labelled
as not a threat (84%) and 23 APKs labelled as a threat (46%).
In the highest threat levels (levels 6 and 7) we have a total amount of 25 APKs labelled
as a threat and 3 labelled as not a threat. This means that the module assigned the highest
threat levels to 50% of the total 50 labelled threat APKs and the solution erroneously tags
11% of the labelled “not a threat” APKs as “a threat” (3 out of 28).
The lowest threat level (levels 3 and 4), counts on 7 APKs: 2 labelled as a “threat” and
5 as “not a threat”. Which means that the module was able to identify 10% (5/50) of the
total amount of APKs labelled as not a threat. For the APKs scored in threat level 4 the
module erroneously tags 33% of the labelled “threat” APKs as “not a threat” (2 out of 6).
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5.3.2.5 Modules accuracy for W1=0,7 and W2=0,3; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.20: Threat prioritisation removing Qark, for W1=0,7 and W2=0,3; W3=0,5 and
W4=0,5; W5=0,7 and W6=0,3
In Figure 5.20 we can see that the majority of the labelled threat and not a threat APKs
are distributed in threat level 5. In that level here are 49 APKs: 26 labelled as not a threat
and 23 labelled as a threat. This means that our solution attributed a threat level of 5
to 52% of the labelled as not a threat APKs and to 46% of the labelled as a threat APKs.
Since for this threat level (5) the solution tags almost half of our sample, we can conclude
that the solution had no relevant accuracy for this intermediate threat level.
In the highest threat levels (levels 6 and 7) we have a total amount of 17 APKs labelled
as a threat. This means that the module assigned the highest threat levels to 34% of the
total 50 labelled threat APKs. For threat level 6, the module assigned 13 APKs labelled as
a threat and 2 APKs labelled as not a threat. This means, that for this level, the solution
erroneously tags 13% of the labelled “not a threat” APKs as “a threat” (2 out of 15).
The lowest threat levels (level 3 and 4), counts on 32 APKs: 10 labelled as a “threat”
and 22 as “not a threat”. For level 4, the module was able to identify 42% (21/50) of the
total amount of APKs labelled as not a threat. However it also identified 20% (10/50) of
the total amount of APKs labelled as a threat.
50
5.3. MODULES ACCURACY
5.3.3 Comparative analysis of the accuracy results
After we collected all the results for the tests in subsection 5.3.1 and subsection 5.3.2 we
made a comparative analysis between the two of them. We will make this comparison
considering how important is the distribution of the APKs by the 10 threat levels for the
decision support mechanism. When we analyse 100 APKs, the prioritised threat list that
results from that analysis will be ordered by threat level. So the first 50 APKs, will be
the ones with the highest threat level, thus the ones to be first analysed by the quality
assurance team. Hence, the solution with more APKs labelled as a threat in the first half
of the prioritisation, is more efficient since the quality assurance team will review more
bad APKs in first place.
5.3.3.1 Comparative analysis for W1=0,3 and W2=0,7; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
(a) Accuracy with all tools (b) Accuracy removing Qark
Figure 5.21: Modules accuracy for W1=0,3 and W2=0,7; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
By looking at Figure 5.21a and Figure 5.21b, we can see that the first 50 APKs are
distributed in threat levels 5, 6 and 7. Table 5.6 give us a summary of the amount of APKs
labelled as a threat by the solution in the two different scenarios.
Threat Level Figure 5.21a Figure 5.21b
7 4% (2/50) 8% (4/50)
6 22% (11/50) 26% (13/50)
5 42% (21/50) 46% (23/50)
Total 68% (34/50) 80% (40/50)
Table 5.6: Comparative analysis of the highest threat levels for the labelled threat APKs
From the table above, we can assess that for the 3 highest threat levels (5, 6 and 7) the
solution identifies more APKs labelled as a threat in the scenario where the slower toll
is removed. However we can also see that, for the same 3 threat levels the solution loses
accuracy, since for the scenario 5.21a we have 62% (34/55) of labelled threat APKs and
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38%(21/55) of labelled as not a threat APKs; whereas for scenario 5.21b we have 59%
(40/68) of labelled threat APKs and 41% (28/68) of APKs labelled as not a threat.
Threat Level Figure 5.21a Figure 5.21b
4 56% (28/50) 42% (21/50)
3 2% (1/50) 2% (1/50)
Total 58% (29/50) 44% (22/50)
Table 5.7: Comparative analysis of the lowest threat levels for the labelled not a threat
APKs
The Table 5.7 give us a summary of the amount of APKs labelled as not a threat by
the solution in the two different scenarios. We can assess that for the 2 lowest threat
levels (3 and 4) the solution identifies more APKs labelled as not a threat in the scenario
where all the tools are operable. However we can also see that, for the same 2 threat levels
the winning solution loses accuracy, since for the scenario 5.21a we have 64%(29/45)
of labelled not a threat APKs and 36%(16/45) of labelled as a threat APKs; whereas for
scenario 5.21b we have 69% (22/32) of labelled not a threat APKs and 31% (10/32) of
APKs labelled as a threat.
5.3.3.2 Comparative analysis for W1=0,4 and W2=0,6; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
(a) Accuracy with all tools (b) Accuracy removing Qark
Figure 5.22: Modules accuracy for W1=0,3 and W2=0,7; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
By looking at Figure 5.22a and Figure 5.22b, we can see that the first 50 APKs are
distributed in threat levels 5, 6 and 7. Table 5.8 give us a summary of the amount of APKs
labelled as a threat by the solution in the two different scenarios.
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Threat Level Figure 5.22a Figure 5.22b
7 4% (2/50) 6% (3/50)
6 12% (6/50) 12% (6/50)
5 40% (20/50) 44% (22/50)
Total 56% (28/50) 62% (31/50)
Table 5.8: Comparative analysis of the highest threat levels for the labelled threat APKs
From the table above, we can assess that for the 3 highest threat levels (5, 6 and 7) the
solution identifies more APKs labelled as a threat in the scenario where the slower toll
is removed. However we can also see that, for the same 3 threat levels the solution loses
accuracy, since for the scenario 5.21b we have 60% (31/52) of labelled threat APKs and
40%(21/52) of labelled as not a threat APKs; whereas for scenario 5.22a we have 67%
(28/42) of labelled threat APKs and 33% (14/42) of APKs labelled as not a threat.
Threat Level Figure 5.22a Figure 5.22b
4 60% (30/50) 44% (22/50)
3 12% (6/50) 2% (1/50)
Total 72% (36/50) 46% (23/50)
Table 5.9: Comparative analysis of the lowest threat levels for the labelled not a threat
APKs
The Table 5.9 give us a summary of the amount of APKs labelled as not a threat by the
solution in the two different scenarios. We can assess that for the 2 lowest threat levels
(3 and 4) the solution identifies more APKs labelled as not a threat in the scenario where
all the tools are operable.We can also see that, for the same 2 threat levels the winning
solution does not loses accuracy when compared with the other. Since for the scenario
5.22a we have 38%(22/58) of labelled threat APKs and 62%(36/58) of labelled as not
a threat APKs; whereas for scenario 5.22b we have 48% (23/48) of labelled not a threat
APKs and 52% (25/48) of APKs labelled as a threat.
5.3.3.3 Comparative analysis for W1=0,5 and W2=0,5; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
Figure 5.23a and Figure 5.23b, show us that the first 50 APKs are distributed in threat
levels 4, 5, 6 and 7. Table 5.10 give us a summary of the amount of APKs labelled as a
threat by the solution in the two different scenarios.
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(a) Accuracy with all tools (b) Accuracy removing Qark
Figure 5.23: Modules accuracy with all the tools and removing the slower tool
From the table below, we can assess that for the 3 highest threat levels (5, 6 and 7) the
solution identifies more APKs labelled as a threat in the scenario where the slower toll
is removed. However we can also see that, for the same 3 threat levels the solution loses
accuracy, since for the scenario 5.23b we have 58% (23/40) of labelled threat APKs and
43%(17/40) of labelled as not a threat APKs; whereas for scenario 5.23a we have 66%
(19/29) of labelled threat APKs and 34% (10/29) of APKs labelled as not a threat.
Threat Level Figure 5.23a Figure 5.23b
7 2% (1/50) 4% (2/50)
6 6% (3/50) 10% (5/50)
5 30% (15/50) 32% (16/50)
4 48% (24/50) 46% (23/50)
Total 86% (43/50) 92% (46/50)
Table 5.10: Comparative analysis of the highest threat levels for the labelled threat APKs
We can also conclude that the solution, for both scenarios, has no relevant accuracy
for the intermediate threat level (level 4). Since the amount of APKs labelled as threat
and not a threat are very close to each other. The Table 5.11 give us a summary of the
amount of APKs labelled as not a threat by the solution in the two different scenarios.
We can assess that for the 2 lowest threat levels (2 and 3) the solution identifies more
APKs labelled as not a threat in the scenario where all the tools are operable. We can also
see that, for the same 2 threat levels the winning solution does not loses accuracy when
compared with the other. Since for the scenario 5.23a we have 32%(7/22) of labelled
threat APKs and 68%(15/22) of labelled as not a threat APKs; whereas for scenario 5.23b




Threat Level Figure 5.23a Figure 5.23b
3 28% (14/50) 16% (8/50)
2 2% (1/50) 0% (0/50)
Total 30% (15/50) 16% (8/50)
Table 5.11: Comparative analysis of the lowest threat levels for the labelled not a threat
APKs
5.3.3.4 Comparative analysis for W1=0,6 and W2=0,4; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
After a quick analysis of the Figure 5.24a and Figure 5.24b, we can see that both have
different threat level distributions for the 100 analysed APKs. We can see that for the
scenario where the slower tool is removed, we have most of our APKs in threat level 5
(42 labelled as not a threat and 23 labelled as a threat). To compare the APK distribution
of the first 50 APKs we have to consider that for the scenario in 5.24a, those 50 APKs
are distributed between the threat levels 4, 5, 6 and 7. Whereas for the scenario in 5.24b
those 50 APKs are distributed between the threat levels 5, 6 and 7.
(a) Accuracy with all tools (b) Accuracy removing Qark
Figure 5.24: Modules accuracy with all the tools and removing the slower tool
From Table 5.12 we can assess that for the scenario where all the tools are used, there
are 4 threat levels assigned to the first half of the prioritised APK list. In those threat
levels (4, 5, 6 and 7), the solution erroneously tags 46% of the labelled “not a threat”
APKs as “a threat” (25 out of 54). For the scenario where the slowest tool is removed,
there are 3 threat levels assigned to the first half of the prioritised APK list. In those
threat levels (5, 6 and 7), the solution erroneously tags 48% of the labelled “not a threat”
APKs as “a threat” (45 out of 93).
Since Figure 5.24b does not have APKs in threat level 2 and the threat level 4 of
Figure 5.24a still belongs to the first 50 APKS of the prioritised list, to compare the lowest
threat levels between the two scenarios we have to look at: threat levels 2 and 3 for the
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Threat Level Figure 5.24a Figure 5.24b
7 6% (3/50) 8% (4/50)
6 4% (2/50) 42% (21/50)
5 16% (8/50) 46% (23/50)
4 32% (16/50) Will not be considered
Total 58% (29/50) 96% (48/50)
Table 5.12: Comparative analysis of the highest threat levels for the labelled threat APKs
scenario where all tools are used and to threat levels 3 and 4 for the scenario where the
slowest tool is removed.




Table 5.13: Lowest threat levels for the scenario with all tools
For the lowest threat levels (2 and 3) in scenario 5.24a, Table 5.13 show us that the
solution identified half of the APKs labelled as not a threat. However it also identified
42% (21/50) of the labelled threat APKs. We can also conclude that for the two lowest
threat levels, 3 and 2, the solution erroneously tags 46% of the labelled “threat” APKs as
“not a threat” (21 out of 46).




Table 5.14: Lowest threat levels for the scenario where the slowest tool was removed
Table 5.14 show us the results of the lowest threat levels (3 and 4) for the scenario
5.24b. We can conclude that the solution identified 10% of the APKs labelled as not a
threat. However it also identified 4% (2/50) of the labelled threat APKs. We can also
conclude that for the two lowest threat levels, 4 and 3, the solution erroneously tags 29%
of the labelled “threat” APKs as “not a threat” (2 out of 7).
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5.3.3.5 Comparative analysis for W1=0,7 and W2=0,3; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
After an analysis of the Figure 5.25a and Figure 5.25b, we can see that both have different
threat level distributions for the 100 analysed APKs. To compare the APK distribution
of the first 50 APKs we have to consider that for the scenario in 5.25a, those 50 APKs
are distributed between the threat levels 4, 5, 6 and 7. Whereas for the scenario in 5.25b
those 50 APKs are distributed between the threat levels 5, 6 and 7.
(a) Accuracy with all tools (b) Accuracy removing Qark
Figure 5.25: Modules accuracy with all the tools and removing the slower tool
From Table 5.15 we can assess that for the scenario where all the tools are used, there
are 4 threat levels assigned to the first half of the prioritised APK list. In those threat
levels (4, 5, 6 and 7), the solution erroneously tags 53% of the labelled “not a threat”
APKs as “threat” (24 out of 45). For the scenario where the slowest tool is removed, there
are 3 threat levels assigned to the first half of the prioritised APK list. In those threat
levels (5, 6 and 7), the solution erroneously tags 38% of the labelled “not a threat” APKs
as “threat” (26 out of 68).
Threat Level Figure 5.25a Figure 5.25b
7 8% (4/50) 8% (4/50)
6 2% (1/50) 26% (13/50)
5 10% (5/50) 46% (23/50)
4 22% (11/50) Will not be considered
Total 42% (21/50) 80% (40/50)
Table 5.15: Comparative analysis of the highest threat levels for the labelled threat APKs
To compare the lowest threat levels we had also to consider the different distribution
of the threat levels by both scenarios. So Table 5.16 give us a summary of the amount of
APKs labelled as not a threat by the solution, but having different threat levels for both
scenarios. We can assess that for the threat levels 2 and 3, regarding the scenario in 5.25a,
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the solution loses accuracy since it identifies more APKs labelled as a threat than APKs
labelled as not a threat.
For the threat levels 3 and 4, regarding the scenario in 5.25b, the solution identifies
more APKs labelled as not a threat than APKs labelled as a threat. We can also see that,
for these 2 threat levels the winning solution does not loses accuracy when compared
with the other. Since we have 31%(10/32) of labelled threat APKs and 69%(22/32) of
labelled as not a threat APKs; whereas for scenario 5.23a we have 53% (29/55) of APKs
labelled as a threat and 47% (26/55) of labelled not a threat APKs.
Threat Level Figure 5.25a Figure 5.25b
4 Will not be considered 16% (21/50)
3 36% (18/50) 2% (1/50)
2 16% (8/50) 0% (0/50)
Total 52% (26/50) 44% (22/50)
Table 5.16: Comparative analysis of the lowest threat levels for the labelled not a threat
APKs
5.3.4 Discussion of the Results
After comparing each weight combination in the two different scenarios, we made con-
clusions based on the capacity of the solution to assign high threat levels to APKs that
have been identified as a threat and low levels to those that have been identified as not a
threat:
• For the weight combination: W1=0,3 and W2=0,7; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
In graphic 5.21b, the module give us more APKs labelled as a threat for the highest
threat levels (levels 5, 6 and 7). However this result has less 3% accuracy than the
result in graphic 5.21a, when giving a high threat level to an APK labelled as a
threat. We also verified that for the scenario where the slowest tool is removed, the
solution has more accuracy than the other from 5.21a.
• For the weight combination: W1=0,4 and W2=0,6; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
In graphic 5.22b, the module give us more APKs labelled as a threat for the highest
threat levels (levels 5, 6 and 7). However this result has less 7% accuracy than the
result in graphic 5.22a, when giving a high threat level to an APK labelled as a
threat.
• For the weight combination: W1=0,5 and W2=0,5; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
For both graphics, 5.23a and 5.23b, looking at threat level 4 there was no relevant
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accuracy. Despite the graphic in 5.23b has more APKs labelled as a threat for the
highest threat levels (levels 5, 6 and 7), it is also concluded that it loses accuracy
(less 8%).
• For the weight combination: W1=0,6 and W2=0,4; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
In graphic 5.24b, the module give us more APKs labelled as a threat for its highest
threat levels (levels 5, 6 and 7). However this result has less 2% accuracy than the
result in graphic 5.24a, when giving a high threat level to an APK labelled as a
threat. We also verified that for the scenario where the slowest tool is removed, the
solution has more accuracy than the other from 5.24a.
• For the weight combination: W1=0,7 and W2=0,3; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5; W5=0,7
and W6=0,3
In graphic 5.25b, the module give us more APKs labelled as a threat for its highest
threat levels (levels 5, 6 and 7). However this result has less 2% accuracy than the
result in graphic 5.25a, when giving a high threat level to an APK labelled as a
threat. We also verified that for the scenario where the slowest tool is removed, the
solution has more accuracy than the other from 5.25a.
In conclusion, our analysis based on these graphics is that the proposed solution give
us more APKs labelled as a threat in the highest threat levels, in the scenario where
the slowest tool is removed. However when we compare the accuracy of the module
on assigning threat levels between the two situations, we assessed that in the situation
where all tools are operable the accuracy is higher. We could also see that the solution
can inform with considerable certainty that APKs with a high threat level, calculated by
the module, are bad.
To support our decision to remove Qark from the selected tools we have also contacted
the developers of the tool and we were informed that we were most likely to see a lot
worse performance on obfuscated code. Even if there should not be infinite loops, it
would take a long time to run due to the increased amount of files and code in general.
After analysing all the facts, we have removed QARK from the modules integration.
5.4 Metrics Results
After the removal of Qark from the set of tools, we decided to make another test case with
a new sample (Sample_3). The goal was to analyse the different results produced by the
module when we have all the possible combinations within the set of values {0,3; 0,4; 0,5;
0,6; 0,7} and respecting the conditions of our metrics.
This new sample, Sample_3, was collected the same way as Sample_2. Therefore, this
sample has 100 APKs that were manually reviewed by the quality assurance team. In the
sample we have 50 APKs that passed the quality assurance test, thus they were labelled
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as “not a threat”. Since the other half of the sample failed the quality assurance manual
analysis, that half is labelled as “a threat”.
Since the analysis of the different results produced by the module will give us a better
understanding on which of the weight combinations have a better accuracy result, we
decided to test all 125 combinations during the analysis of the metrics results. The results
of the 125 weight combinations are available in a shared folder.
We divided our analysis into 5 groups and compared, for each group, the results
obtained in order to select the best one. This comparison was made based on the amount
of APKs labelled as a threat, distributed in the first half of the prioritised threat level
list. This also means that we have chosen the results that gave us more APKs labelled as
a threat in highest threat levels. Figure 5.26, Figure 5.27, Figure 5.28, Figure 5.29 and
Figure 5.30 represent the best results from each group. Below we make a descriptive
analysis to each one of them.
Figure 5.26: Threat prioritisation for Sample_3 W1=0,3 and W2=0,7; W3=0,4 and W4=0,6;
W5=0,5 and W6=0,5
Looking at Figure 5.26, we observed that the first half of the prioritisation of the
module is composed by 44% of the total amount of APKs labelled as not a threat and 56%
of the total amount of APKs labelled as a threat. We can also observe that in the highest
threat level (level 7) we have 10% of the total amount of APKs labelled as not a threat.
Wherein the APKs labelled as threat only start to appear in the followed threat levels (5
and 6).
The other half of the prioritised threat list (levels from 1 to 4), is composed by 34% of
APKs labelled as a threat and 48% of APKs labelled as not a threat.
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Figure 5.27: Threat prioritisation for Sample_3 W1=0,4 and W2=0,6; W3=0,5 and W4=0,5;
W5=0,5 and W6=0,5
Figure 5.27 show us that the first half of the prioritisation of the module is composed
by 52% of APKs labelled as a threat and 40% labelled as not a threat. We can also observe
that in the highest threat level (level 7) we have 4% of the total amount of APKs labelled
as not a threat. Wherein the APKs labelled as threat only start to appear in the followed
threat levels (5 and 6).
The other half of the prioritised threat list (levels from 1 to 4), is composed by 48% of
APKs labelled as a threat and 60% of APKs labelled as not a threat.
Figure 5.28: Threat prioritisation for Sample_3 W1=0,5 and W2=0,5; W3=0,3 and W4=0,7;
W5=0,5 and W6=0,5
Figure 5.28 show us that the first half of the prioritisation of the module is composed
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by 60% of APKs labelled as a threat and 38% labelled as not a threat. We can also observe
that in the two highest threat levels (levels 7 and 8) we have 6% of the total amount of
APKs labelled as not a threat. Wherein the APKs labelled as a threat only begging to
appear in level 6, with 16 APKs labelled as a threat and 11 APKs labelled as not a threat.
The other half of the prioritised threat list (levels from 1 to 4), is composed by 40% of
APKs labelled as a threat and 62% of APKs labelled as not a threat. We could also observe
that the APKs labelled as a threat are distributed even in the lowest threat level.
Figure 5.29: Threat prioritisation for Sample_3 W1=0,6 and W2=0,4; W3=0,6 and W4=0,4;
W5=0,4 and W6=0,6
Looking at Figure 5.29, we observed that the first half of the prioritisation of the
module (threat levels 4 to 6) is composed by 40% of APKs labelled as not a threat and
52% of APKs labelled as a threat. We can also observe that for the highest threat levels
(level 5 and 6) we have 65% of APKs labelled as not a threat and 35% of APKs labelled
as a threat. This means that in the highest threat levels the module gave a high score to
more APKs labelled as not a threat (11 out of 17) than to APKs labelled as a threat (6 out
of 17).
The other half of the prioritised threat list (levels from 1 to 3), is composed by 48% of
APKs labelled as a threat and 60% of APKs labelled as not a threat. We can also see that
the APKs labelled as a threat are distributed trough all the lowest threat levels; there is
no clear distinction between the two types of APK.
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Figure 5.30: Threat prioritisation for Sample_3 W1=0,7 and W2=0,3; W3=0,4 and W4=0,6;
W5=0,3 and W6=0,7
Figure 5.30 show us that the first half of the prioritisation of the module (threat levels
4 to 7) is composed by 44% of APKs labelled as not a threat and 56% of APKs labelled
as a threat. We can also observe that for the highest threat level (level 7) we have 4% of
APKs labelled as not a threat.
The other half of the prioritised threat list (levels from 1 to 3), is composed by 44% of
APKs labelled as a threat and 56% of APKs labelled as not a threat. We can also see that
the APKs labelled as a threat are distributed trough all the lowest threat levels.
5.5 Discussion
After an analysis of the modules accuracy results for Sample_3, we saw that for this
sample our module had very bad results on assigning threat levels corresponding to the
APK true value (threat or not a threat). We could even say that the solution was not able
to make a distinction between the two types of APKs. Table 5.17 has a summary of the
analysis of the 5 best results. There we can see the APK distribution by threat level and
type (T for threat and NT for not a threat), for all the five results. By analysing the table
we can see that for Figure 5.28 there are more APKs labelled as a threat in the highest
threat levels (60% of the total amount of the APKs labelled as a threat), however we can
not consider this as a good result since for the highest threat levels (7 and 8) there are only
APKs labelled as not a threat (NT). In order to understand the nature of these results, we
decided to look into our sample, to find out what went wrong in this test case.
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Threat Level Figure 5.26 Figure 5.27 Figure 5.28 Figure 5.29 Figure 5.30
T | NT T | NT T | NT T | NT T | NT
1 0 | 1 0 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 3 6 | 10
2 1 | 0 2 | 0 5 | 6 10 | 11 7 | 9
3 6 | 10 7 | 14 6 | 11 13 | 16 9 | 9
4 10 | 13 15 | 15 9 | 12 20 | 9 13 | 7
5 17 | 11 23 | 11 14 | 5 4 | 6 11 | 7
6 16 | 10 3 | 7 16 | 11 2 | 5 4 | 6
7 0 | 5 0 | 2 0 | 1 0 | 0 0 | 2
8 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 2 0 | 0 0 | 0
9 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0
10 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0
Table 5.17: Comparative analysis between the 5 best results of Sample_3 (T-Threat and
NT-Not a threat)
We started by manually reviewing the APKs labelled as a threat in the sample by
installing them and interacting with them. We connected our android device to a web
debugging proxy application (Charles [Kar]) to visualise the data that is sent and received
from the installed APK. During this process we found out that 64% of the threat sample
is composed by APKs that were just a view or a button (fake); 30% were APKs that had
links to advertisement (ads) and the rest 6% were APKs that were error messages (crash),
e.g. the APK could not be executed because it was missing resources (see Figure 5.31).
Figure 5.31: Distribution of the APKs labelled as a threat after our manual review
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Since our module main goal is to find security vulnerabilities, it was understandable
that in the case where an application is just a view or a button the threat level assigned
to the application will be lower when compared with the labelled as not a threat APKs.
In order to substantiate this conclusion we took a look at the amount of problems found
in total and in average for the two types of APKs. According to Figure 5.32 for each
APK labelled as “not a threat” there was in average 72,8 problems found, whereas for
each APK labelled as “a threat” there was in average 52,58 problems found. The total
amount of problems found for the APKs labelled as a “threat” was of 2629, while for the
APKs labelled as “not a threat” was of 3640. This means that for the APKs labelled as “a
threat” there was approximately less 30% problems found (which represents 1011 less
problems).
Figure 5.32: Total amount of problems found in Sample_3, distributed by “threat” and
“not a threat” labels
From this setback we learned that to evaluate this module properly we should not
depend on the samples reviewed by the quality assurance team. Since our threat level
rating system is based on the amount of problems found, an APK that is only a button or
a view will not be considered a threat, regarding the evaluation of the quality assurance
team. However, we have also discovered a secondary effect of the analyse made by the
module. By looking at the problems discovered by the module for each analysed APK,
we found out that the module was able to identify a phenomenon called repackaging. A
repackaging attack is a very common type of attacks on Android devices. In such attack,
scammers do so by riding on the popularity of existing applications, embedding them
with unwanted content—even malicious payloads—and masquerading them as legitimate
and uploading them into app markets [Tre].
Table 5.18 represents the result of the analysis of three different APKs. If we look
carefully we can see that despite all three APKs have a different md5sum (unique id), the
module have identified for all of them the same problems and assigned the same severity
to each problem found. After we installed each of these 3 APKs, we realised that they were
the same application with only a few changes. However the goal of these applications
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md5sum Type of Problem Tool Gravity
1 MOBSF 1
3 SUPER 0,6










48289c4a3f73f0cecaf5a414b2984374 5 AndroBugs 0,5
9 SUPER 1
10 SUPER 0,6
Table 5.18: Analysis result of three different APKs
was the same, all manipulated the user to access an advertisement (see Figure 5.33).




In this chapter, we made several test cases in order to analyse the performance and
accuracy of the model. Based on those results we made decisions that helped us adjust
the architecture of the module to our goals.
We started by testing and comparing the modules execution time between a sequential
and parallel arrange of the tools. We concluded that in a sequential execution of the tools,
the module took 20 hours and 45 minutes to analyse 100 APKs (12 minutes and 26
seconds in average per APK); wherein a parallel execution of the tools the module took 16
hours and 47 minutes (10 minutes and 4 seconds in average per APK). We observed that
the difference between the analysis time for the two scenarios, was only of 19%. So we
decided to look at the analysis time distributed by each tool, in order to find the slowest
tool. We found out that Qark took 64% of the total analysis time, thus we proceeded to
our next test case.
In order to see if we could lower the analysis time, we compared the performance and
accuracy of the module in an architecture with all tools and other without the slowest
tool (Qark). We concluded that the module gave us more APKs labelled as a threat in the
highest threat levels in an architecture where the slowest tool is removed, however there
is a loss of its initial accuracy (gave us also more APKs labelled as not a threat in high
threat levels). After contacting the developers of Qark, we were informed that we were
most likely to see a lot worse performance on obfuscated code. Even if there should not
be infinite loops, it would take a long time to run due to the increased amount of files
and code in general. After analysing all the facts, we removed QARK from the modules
integration. Despite the module timing has improved, 4 minutes is still an issue if an
app store, with over 15 thousand uploads per day, wants to implement it. The enormous
amount of uploaded apps would never be followed by our module, in a daily bases. So
as a solution to this problem, we decided to change the process of retrieving APKs from
extracting uploaded apps to extracting apps that receive negative feedback.
After the removal of Qark from the set of tools, we decided to make another test
case with a new sample to understand the impact of the weight combinations on the
results accuracy, so we decided to test all 125 combinations. From that analysis we had
results that showed us that the module was not being able to make a proper threat level
attribution to the different types of APKs. That is, to the APKs labelled as not a threat
were given high threat levels and despite most of the APKs labelled as a threat having
also high threat level, there was a percentage of the total amount of APKs labelled as not
a threat that had low threat levels. This led us to explore the type f APKs of our sample
(Sample_3).
By manually reviewing our sample, we found out that 64% of the threat sample was
composed by APKs that were just a view or a button; 30% were APKs that had links to
advertisement (ads) and the rest 6% were APKs that were error messages (crash), e.g. the
APK could not be executed because it was missing resources. We also discovered that for
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each APK labelled as “not a threat” there was in average 72,8 problems found, whereas
for each APK labelled as “a threat” there was in average 52,58 problems found. Since
our module main goal is to find security vulnerabilities, it was understandable that in
the case where an application is just a view or a button the threat level assigned to the
application will be lower when compared with the labelled as not a threat APKs. However,
we also discovered a secondary effect of the analyse made by the module. By looking at
the problems uncovered by the module, for each analysed APK, we found out that the
module was able to identify a phenomenon called repackaging.
We concluded that the module should be evaluated with a sample reviewed not by
the standards of the quality assurance team of Aptoide, but with a sample that contains











This dissertation had as main goal: the creation of an automated validation of applications
at the app market level.
We first started by evaluating the different software verification and validation tech-
niques. During our research we found out that this is typically done through three tech-
niques: manual code review [Gee16], automatic analysis comprehended between dynamic
[Bal99] or static [Wic+95] approaches and semi-automatic with theorem provers [Duf91].
After we weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each technique with the complexi-
ties of our own project, we chose static analysis as the selection criteria of the tools to be
integrated in our system.
Before the selection of static analysis tools, we conducted a search on the different
types of security vulnerabilities. According to a present study on security smells in
Android [Gha+17], there are 28 symptoms in the code that signal the prospect of a security
vulnerability that may lead to vulnerabilities in applications. From those 28, we chose to
pursue 16.
Then we set rules to begin the process of collecting and analysing static analysis
tools. We considered 8 tools but after the testing phase we only kept 5 (AndroBugs [Gita],
Evicheck [Evi], MobSF [Gitc], Qark [Gitd] and SUPER [Gite]).
With the tools selected we started the implementation of an automatic tool for tar-
geting the inspection of applications with programming malpractices (due to poor im-
plementation/engineering choices) in the Aptoide context. The module is supported by
our selected static analysis tools and work as a decision support for the quality assur-
ance team. This support is given trough a prioritised collection of APKs, ordered by
the threat it represents. The module allows the members of the quality assurance team
to better manage their time by manually reviewing the applications with more security
vulnerabilities. To evaluate the threat level of an APK, we created metrics based on the
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hypothesis that if an APK has several severe problems reported by the static analysis tools
and there is a big quantity of negative user’s feedback, then it is likely that the application
is harmful to the consumers.
During the testing phase of the module, we observed that QARK, in most cases, was
the tool that took about 80% of the analysis time. So we decided to make a comparative
analyses of the accuracy and execution time of the module when operating with all tools
and when removing the slowest tool. This comparison analysis confirmed that the exe-
cution time was less when removing the slowest tool. But, other conclusions were also
made: the module could inform with considerable certainty that APKs with the highest
level of risk calculated by the solution were bad, but the removal of the slowest tool made
the module lose some of its initial accuracy.
Although the module improves and strengthens the application validation process
by uncovering problems that were not previously exposed, after we made more tests we
realised that the module was not adjusted to the case where an application, considered as
a threat, is just a link to a commercial or a “draft” (applications that have only a button
or an image).
6.1 Contributions
The main contribution of this dissertation was the process for the definition, elaboration
and evaluation of an automated validation of applications for the app stores. In the
context of the Aptoide app store we modelled the automated validation as a static analysis
module for the threat evaluation of Android applications. Its purpose is to effectively
evaluate the threat level of an application (based on the security vulnerabilities of the
application), to inform the quality assurance team on what applications are in need of
a manual review. It also contributes to the enhancement of the validation capability of
the Aptoide app store. The analysis system is based on 4 static analysis tools (AndroBugs
[Gita], Evicheck [Evi], MobSF [Gitc] and SUPER [Gite]) and the threat rating system of an
application is based on metrics developed by us. In our opinion, our model is extensible
as it can be easily used to integrate with other analysis tools.
Another contribution were the metrics used for the threat rating system. These metrics
helped us relate the data we obtained from the analysis of the module with a quantitative
evaluation of the submitted applications.
6.2 Limitations
During the implementation of the solution, we faced two main challenges: the perfor-
mance and the code obfuscation. According to the tests, in average our module could
analyse one APK in 4 minutes. Even if its timing has improved, 4 minutes is still an
issue if an app store, with over 15 thousand uploads per day, wants to implement it. The
enormous amount of uploaded apps would never be followed by our module, in a daily
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bases. In addition, since the state of the art is not yet capable of efficiently analysing apps
that have obfuscated code, the performance is also dependent on the code obfuscation.
We could have multiple machines running the proposed solution, but that would just
be a trade off between cost and benefit. So as a solution to this problem, we proposed
that the module should only be used for apps that receive negative feedback. This way it
could have a better chance to give a daily output.
The validation and accuracy of the proposed solution, had also some challenges. We
evaluated the modules accuracy based on samples of applications that had been previ-
ously manually analysed by the quality assurance team. To the applications that had
failed the manual analysis we labelled them as a threat and to the ones that passed the
manual analysis test we labelled them as not a threat. However, during one of our tests we
observed that the modules accuracy was very low and when we looked into the content of
the sample we observed that the sample had a majority of “draft” applications labelled as
a threat. These “draft” applications, are applications that have only a button or an image;
something that does not appear to be finished and is very simplistic. So when our module
analyses one of these applications, it does not find as many security vulnerabilities as it
should find for an application labelled as a threat. Thus, it will believe that the applica-
tion is “good”. The lack of a more precise user feedback system, also posed a limitation
in the process of assigning a threat level to an application.
6.3 Future Work
Future developments should include improvements to threat indication reliability and
comprehensibility, experimenting our methodology with threat evaluation algorithms,
and presenting a customised report of threat indicators on the basis of the specific security
vulnerabilities characteristics. This way the member of the quality assurance team that
starts the evaluation of a high threat level application, will know what to look for in the
manual inspection.
However, the first step is to improve the accuracy of the module. There are two possi-
ble solutions: the first one is to provide a finer-grained threat category range, generating
threat categories with more evident security vulnerabilities. The second solution is to inte-
grate with more static analysis tools, capable of uncovering other security vulnerabilities.
It should also be considered the introduction of a "commercial"detection module.
Another relevant development could be the indication of the threat level of an appli-
cation to enhance end-user security awareness. The app store could show the app’s threat
level along with its recommendation value. Or could also have available a customised
threat report, to show all the information about the security vulnerabilities of the applica-
tion. Regarding the user feedback, the current system does not give precise information
on the problems found by the end-user; so another suggestion, as future work, would be
to improve the sensitivity of user feedback.
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In addition, the app store could enhance the security awareness of the developer by
giving a detailed report about the security vulnerabilities of the Android app package
uploaded. In fact, the app store could even make a set of rules based on the problems
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This app has code getting the 64-bit number ”Set-
tings.Secure.ANDROID_ID”. ANDROID_ID seems a good
choice for a unique device identifier. There are downsides:
First, it is not 100% reliable on releases of Android prior
to 2.2 (Froyo). Also, there has been at least one widely-
observed bug in a popular handset from a major manufac-
turer, where every instance has the same ANDROID_ID. If
you want to get an unique id for the device, we suggest you
use ”Installation” framework in the following article.
Warning
Please make sure this app has the conditions to check the
validation of SSL Certificate. If it’s not properly checked,
it MAY allows self-signed, expired or mismatch CN certifi-
cates for SSL connection. This is a critical vulnerability and
allows attackers to do MITM attacks without your knowl-
edge. If you are transmitting users’ username or password,
these sensitive information may be leaking.
Warning
Table A.1: Result of AndroBugs for MB Way
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Issue Severity
ADB Backup is ENABLED for this app (default: ENABLED).
ADB Backup is a good tool for backing up all of your files. If
it’s open for this app, people who have your phone can copy
all of the sensitive data for this app in your phone (Prerequi-
site: 1.Unlock phone’s screen 2.Open the developer mode).
The sensitive data may include lifetime access token, user-
name or password, etc.
Notice
This app is using Android SQLite databases. Prior to An-
droid 4.0, Android has SQLite Journal Information Disclo-
sure Vulnerability. But it can only be solved by users up-
grading to Android > 4.0 and YOU CANNOT SOLVE IT BY
YOURSELF
Notice
Everything you delete may be recovered by any user or at-
tacker, especially rooted devices.Please make sure do not
use ”file.delete()” to delete essential files.
Notice
Found codes for checking ”Application-
Info.FLAG_DEBUGGABLE” in AndroidManifest.xml
Notice





The Keystores below seem using ”byte array” or ”hard-
coded cert info” to do SSL pinning (Total: 1). Please manu-
ally check.
Critical
To ensure your app is secure, always use an explicit intent
when starting a Service and DO NOT declare intent filters
for your services. Using an implicit intent to start a service
is a security hazard because you cannot be certain what
service will respond to the intent, and the user cannot see
which service starts.
Critical
This app allows Self-defined HOSTNAME VERIFIER to ac-
cept all Common Names(CN). This is a critical vulnerability
and allows attackers to do MITM attacks with his valid cer-
tificate without your knowledge.
Critical
URLs that are NOT under SSL (Total:8). Critical
This app DOES NOT check the validation of SSL Certificate.
It allows self-signed, expired or mismatch CN certificates
for SSL connection. This is a critical vulnerability and al-
lows attackers to do MITM attacks without your knowledge.
If you are transmitting users’ username or password, these
sensitive information may be leaking.
Critical
Found a critical WebView ”addJavascriptInterface” vulner-
ability. This method can be used to allow JavaScript to con-
trol the host application. This is a powerful feature, but
also presents a security risk for applications targeted to API
level JELLY_BEAN(4.2) or below, because JavaScript could
use reflection to access an injected object’s public fields. Use
of this method in a WebView containing untrusted content
could allow an attacker to manipulate the host application
in unintended ways, executing Java code with the permis-
sions of the host application.
Critical
Table A.3: Result of AndroBugs for Wallet
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Issue Severity
External storage access found (Remember DO NOT write
important files to external storage)
Warning
Found ”exported” components(except for Launcher) for
receiving outside applications’ actions (AndroidMani-
fest.xml). These components can be initialised by other
apps. You should add or modify the attribute to [ex-
ported=”false”] if you don’t want to. You can also pro-
tect it with a customised permission with ”signature” or
higher protectionLevel and specify in ”android:permission”
attribute.
Warning
This app has code getting the 64-bit number ”Set-
tings.Secure.ANDROID_ID”. ANDROID_ID seems a good
choice for a unique device identifier. There are downsides:
First, it is not 100% reliable on releases of Android prior
to 2.2 (Froyo). Also, there has been at least one widely-
observed bug in a popular handset from a major manufac-
turer, where every instance has the same ANDROID_ID.
Warning
Found ”setAllowFileAccess(true)” or not set(enabled by de-
fault) in Web-view. The attackers could inject malicious
script into Web-view and exploit the opportunity to access
local resources. This can be mitigated or prevented by dis-
abling local file system access.
Warning
Found ”setJavaScriptEnabled(true)” in WebView, which
could exposed to potential XSS attacks. Please check the
web page code carefully and sanitise the output.
Warning




This app is using Android SQLite databases but it’s ”NOT”
suffering from SQLite Journal Information Disclosure Vul-
nerability.
Notice
Everything you delete may be recovered by any user or at-
tacker, especially rooted devices. Please make sure do not
use ”file.delete()” to delete essential files.
Notice
Found using the symmetric key(PRAGMA key) to encrypt
the SQLite databases.
Notice
Found codes for checking ”Application-
Info.FLAG_DEBUGGABLE” in AndroidManifest.xml
Notice
This app is using the Internet via HTTP protocol. Info




Found Base64 encoding ”String(s)” (Total: 3). We cannot
guarantee all of the Strings are Base64 encoding and also
we will not show you the decoded binary file:
Critical
SSL Connection Checking: URLs that are NOT under SSL
(Total:7)
Critical
Table A.6: Result of AndroBugs for Drink Water
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Issue Severity
Dynamic code loading(DexClassLoader) found Warning
This app has code getting the ”device id(IMEI)” but there
are problems with this ”TelephonyManager.getDeviceId()”
approach.
Warning
This app has code getting the 64-bit number ”Set-
tings.Secure.ANDROID_ID”. ANDROID_ID seems a good
choice for a unique device identifier. There are downsides:
First, it is not 100% reliable on releases of Android prior
to 2.2 (Froyo). Also, there has been at least one widely-
observed bug in a popular handset from a major manufac-
turer, where every instance has the same ANDROID_ID.
Warning
Found ”setAllowFileAccess(true)” or not set(enabled by de-
fault) in Web-view. The attackers could inject malicious
script into Web-view and exploit the opportunity to access
local resources. This can be mitigated or prevented by dis-
abling local file system access.
Warning
Found ”setJavaScriptEnabled(true)” in WebView, which
could exposed to potential XSS attacks. Please check the
web page code carefully and sanitize the output.
Warning




ADB Backup is ENABLED for this app (default: ENABLED).
ADB Backup is a good tool for backing up all of your files. If
it’s open for this app, people who have your phone can copy
all of the sensitive data for this app in your phone (Prerequi-
site: 1.Unlock phone’s screen 2.Open the developer mode).
The sensitive data may include lifetime access token, user-
name or password, etc.
Notice
Everything you delete may be recovered by any user or at-
tacker, especially rooted devices. Please make sure do not
use ”file.delete()” to delete essential files.
Notice
This app is using Android SQLite databases but it’s ”NOT”
suffering from SQLite Journal Information Disclosure Vul-
nerability.
Notice
Everything you delete may be recovered by any user or at-
tacker, especially rooted devices. Please make sure do not
use ”file.delete()” to delete essential files.
Notice
This app is using the Internet via HTTP protocol. Info
Table A.8: Result of AndroBugs for Drink Water
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Freelectics Bodyweight
Issue Severity
Security issues ”MODE_WORLD_READABLE” or
”MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE” found.
Critical
To ensure your app is secure, always use an explicit intent
when starting a Service and DO NOT declare intent filters
for your services. Using an implicit intent to start a service
is a security hazard because you cannot be certain what
service will respond to the intent, and the user cannot see
which service starts.
Critical
URLs that are NOT under SSL (Total:62). Critical
Found a critical WebView ”addJavascriptInterface” vulner-
ability. This method can be used to allow JavaScript to con-
trol the host application. This is a powerful feature, but
also presents a security risk for applications targeted to API
level JELLY_BEAN(4.2) or below, because JavaScript could
use reflection to access an injected object’s public fields. Use
of this method in a Web-view containing untrusted content
could allow an attacker to manipulate the host application
in unintended ways, executing Java code with the permis-
sions of the host application.
Critical




External storage access found (Remember DO NOT write
important files to external storages)
Warning
Found ”exported” components(except for Launcher) for
receiving outside applications’ actions (AndroidMani-
fest.xml). These components can be initilized by other
apps. You should add or modify the attribute to [ex-
ported=”false”] if you don’t want to. You can also pro-
tect it with a customized permission with ”signature” or
higher protectionLevel and specify in ”android:permission”
attribute.
Warning
This app has code getting the 64-bit number ”Set-
tings.Secure.ANDROID_ID”. ANDROID_ID seems a good
choice for a unique device identifier. There are downsides:
First, it is not 100% reliable on releases of Android prior
to 2.2 (Froyo). Also, there has been at least one widely-
observed bug in a popular handset from a major manufac-
turer, where every instance has the same ANDROID_ID. If
you want to get an unique id for the device, we suggest you
use ”Installation” framework in the following article.
Warning
Found ”setAllowFileAccess(true)” or not set(enabled by de-
fault) in WebView. The attackers could inject malicious
script into WebView and exploit the opportunity to access
local resources. This can be mitigated or prevented by dis-
abling local file system access.
Warning
Found ”setJavaScriptEnabled(true)” in WebView, which
could exposed to potential XSS attacks. Please check the
web page code.
Warning
Table A.10: Result of AndroBugs for Freelectics Bodyweight
Issue Severity
Everything you delete may be recovered by any user or at-
tacker, especially rooted devices. Please make sure do not
use ”file.delete()” to delete essential files.
Notice
This app is using Android SQLite databases but it’s ”NOT”
suffering from SQLite Journal Information Disclosure Vul-
nerability.
Notice
This app is using the Internet via HTTP protocol. Info
Table A.11: Result of AndroBugs for Freelectics Bodyweight
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App Sandbox Permission Checking: Secu-
rity issues ”MODE_WORLD_READABLE” or
”MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE” found
Critical
SSL Connection Checking: URLs that are NOT under SSL
(Total:3)
Critical
WebView RCE Vulnerability Checking: Found a critical We-
bView ”addJavascriptInterface” vulnerability. This method
can be used to allow JavaScript to control the host applica-
tion. This is a powerful feature, but also presents a security
risk for applications targeted to API level JELLY_BEAN(4.2)
or below, because JavaScript could use reflection to access
an injected object’s public fields. Use of this method in a
Web-view containing untrusted content could allow an at-
tacker to manipulate the host application in unintended
ways, executing Java code with the permissions of the host
application.
Critical




External storage access found (Remember DO NOT write
important files to external storages)
Warning
This app has code getting the ”device id(IMEI)” but there
are problems with this ”TelephonyManager.getDeviceId()”
approach.
Warning
This app has code getting the 64-bit number ”Set-
tings.Secure.ANDROID_ID”. ANDROID_ID seems a good
choice for a unique device identifier. There are downsides:
First, it is not 100% reliable on releases of Android prior
to 2.2 (Froyo). Also, there has been at least one widely-
observed bug in a popular handset from a major manufac-
turer, where every instance has the same ANDROID_ID.
Warning
Found ”setAllowFileAccess(true)” or not set(enabled by de-
fault) in Web-view. The attackers could inject malicious
script into Web-view and exploit the opportunity to access
local resources. This can be mitigated or prevented by dis-
abling local file system access.
Warning
Found ”setJavaScriptEnabled(true)” in WebView, which
could exposed to potential XSS attacks. Please check the
web page code carefully and sanitize the output.
Warning
Table A.13: Result of AndroBugs for Clash-Royale
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Issue Severity
ADB Backup is ENABLED for this app (default: ENABLED).
ADB Backup is a good tool for backing up all of your files. If
it’s open for this app, people who have your phone can copy
all of the sensitive data for this app in your phone (Prerequi-
site: 1.Unlock phone’s screen 2.Open the developer mode).
The sensitive data may include lifetime access token, user-
name or password, etc.
Notice
The app may has the code checking for ”root” permission,
mounting file-system operations or monitoring system.
Notice
This app is using Android SQLite databases but it’s ”NOT”
suffering from SQLite Journal Information Disclosure Vul-
nerability.
Notice
Everything you delete may be recovered by any user or at-
tacker, especially rooted devices. Please make sure do not
use ”file.delete()” to delete essential files.
Notice
This app is using the Internet via HTTP protocol. Info
Table A.14: Result of AndroBugs for Clash-Royale
Millionaire 2018
Issue Severity
Security issues ”MODE_WORLD_READABLE” or
”MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE” found.
Critical
Found ”exported” ContentProvider, allowing any other app
on the device to access it (AndroidManifest.xml). You
should modify the attribute to [exported=”false”] or set at
least ”signature” protectionalLevel permission if you don’t
want to.
Critical
URLs that are NOT under SSL (Total:2). Critical
Found a critical WebView ”addJavascriptInterface” vulner-
ability. This method can be used to allow JavaScript to con-
trol the host application. This is a powerful feature, but
also presents a security risk for applications targeted to API
level JELLY_BEAN(4.2) or below, because JavaScript could
use reflection to access an injected object’s public fields. Use
of this method in a Web-view containing untrusted content
could allow an attacker to manipulate the host application
in unintended ways, executing Java code with the permis-
sions of the host application.
Critical




Dynamic code loading(DexClassLoader) found. Warning
External storage access found (Remember DO NOT write
important files to external storages)
Warning
This app has code getting the 64-bit number ”Set-
tings.Secure.ANDROID_ID”. ANDROID_ID seems a good
choice for a unique device identifier. There are downsides:
First, it is not 100% reliable on releases of Android prior
to 2.2 (Froyo). Also, there has been at least one widely-
observed bug in a popular handset from a major manufac-
turer, where every instance has the same ANDROID_ID. If
you want to get an unique id for the device, we suggest you
use ”Installation” framework in the following article.
Warning
Please make sure this app has the conditions to check the
validation of SSL Certificate. If it’s not properly checked,
it MAY allows self-signed, expired or mismatch CN certifi-
cates for SSL connection. This is a critical vulnerability and
allows attackers to do MITM attacks without your knowl-
edge. If you are transmitting users’ username or password,
these sensitive information may be leaking.
Warning
Found ”setAllowFileAccess(true)” or not set(enabled by de-
fault) in WebView. The attackers could inject malicious
script into WebView and exploit the opportunity to access
local resources. This can be mitigated or prevented by dis-
abling local file system access.
Warning
Found ”setJavaScriptEnabled(true)” in WebView, which
could exposed to potential XSS attacks. Please check the
web page code.
Warning
Table A.16: Result of AndroBugs for Millionaire 2018
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Issue Severity
ADB Backup is ENABLED for this app (default: ENABLED).
ADB Backup is a good tool for backing up all of your files. If
it’s open for this app, people who have your phone can copy
all of the sensitive data for this app in your phone (Prerequi-
site: 1.Unlock phone’s screen 2.Open the developer mode).
The sensitive data may include lifetime access token, user-
name or password, etc.
Notice
This app is using Android SQLite databases but it’s ”NOT”
suffering from SQLite Journal Information Disclosure Vul-
nerability.
Notice
Found codes for checking ”Application-
Info.FLAG_DEBUGGABLE” in AndroidManifest.xml
Notice
The Keystores below are ”protected” by password and seem
using SSL-pinning (Total: 1).
Notice
This app is using the Internet via HTTP protocol. Info






This app is using critical function ’Run-
time.getRuntime().exec(”...”)’. Please confirm that those
code sections are not harmful.
Critical
This app allows Self-defined HOSTNAME VERIFIER to ac-
cept all Common Names(CN). This is a critical vulnerability
and allows attackers to do MITM attacks with his valid cer-
tificate without your knowledge.
Critical
URLs that are NOT under SSL (Total:38). Critical
This app DOES NOT check the validation of SSL Certificate.
It allows self-signed, expired or mismatch CN certificates
for SSL connection. This is a critical vulnerability and al-
lows attackers to do MITM attacks without your knowledge.
If you are transmitting users’ username or password, these
sensitive information may be leaking.
Critical
This app has very high privileges. Use it
carefully. Critical use-permission found: ”an-
droid.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS”.
Critical
Found a critical WebView ”addJavascriptInterface” vulner-
ability. This method can be used to allow JavaScript to con-
trol the host application. This is a powerful feature, but
also presents a security risk for applications targeted to API
level JELLY_BEAN(4.2) or below, because JavaScript could
use reflection to access an injected object’s public fields. Use
of this method in a WebView containing ntrusted content
could allow an attacker to manipulate the host application
in unintended ways, executing Java code with the permis-
sions of the host application.
Critical
Table A.18: Result of AndroBugs for LOCKit
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Issue Severity
External storage access found (Remember DO NOT write
important files to external storages)
Warning
Found ”exported” components(except for Launcher) for
receiving outside applications’ actions (AndroidMani-
fest.xml). These components can be initilized by other
apps. You should add or modify the attribute to [ex-
ported=”false”] if you don’t want to. You can also pro-
tect it with a customized permission with ”signature” or
higher protectionLevel and specify in ”android:permission”
attribute.
Warning
This app has code getting the ”device id(IMEI)” but there
are problems with this ”TelephonyManager.getDeviceId()”
approach.
Warning
This app has code getting the 64-bit number ”Set-
tings.Secure.ANDROID_ID”. ANDROID_ID seems a good
choice for a unique device identifier. There are downsides:
First, it is not 100% reliable on releases of Android prior
to 2.2 (Froyo). Also, there has been at least one widely-
observed bug in a popular handset from a major manufac-
turer, where every instance has the same ANDROID_ID. If
you want to get an unique id for the device, we suggest you
use ”Installation” framework in the following article.
Warning
Found ”setAllowFileAccess(true)” or not set(enabled by de-
fault) in WebView. The attackers could inject malicious
script into WebView and exploit the opportunity to access
local resources. This can be mitigated or prevented by dis-
abling local file system access.
Warning
Found ”setJavaScriptEnabled(true)” in WebView, which
could exposed to potential XSS attacks. Please check the
web page code.
Warning




ADB Backup is ENABLED for this app (default: ENABLED).
ADB Backup is a good tool for backing up all of your files. If
it’s open for this app, people who have your phone can copy
all of the sensitive data for this app in your phone (Prerequi-
site: 1.Unlock phone’s screen 2.Open the developer mode).
The sensitive data may include lifetime access token, user-
name or password, etc.
Notice
The app may has the code checking for ”root” permission,
mounting filesystem operations or monitoring system.
Notice
This app is using Android SQLite databases but it’s ”NOT”
suffering from SQLite Journal Information Disclosure Vul-
nerability.
Notice
Everything you delete may be recovered by any user or at-
tacker, especially rooted devices.Please make sure do not
use ”file.delete()” to delete essential files.
Notice
Found codes for checking ”Application-
Info.FLAG_DEBUGGABLE” in AndroidManifest.xml
Notice
This app is using the Internet via HTTP protocol. info
Table A.20: Result of AndroBugs for LOCKit
My Passwords - Password Manager
Issue Severity
’Fragment’ or ’Fragment for ActionbarSherlock’ has a severe
vulnerability prior to Android 4.4 (API 19).
Critical
Security issues ”MODE_WORLD_READABLE” or
”MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE” found.
Critical
URLs that are NOT under SSL (Total:2). Critical
This app has some internet accessing codes but does not
have ’android.permission.INTERNET’ use-permission in
AndroidManifest.
Critical
Table A.21: Result of AndroBugs for My Passwords
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Issue Severity
External storage access found (Remember DO NOT write
important files to external storages)
Warning
Found ”setAllowFileAccess(true)” or not set(enabled by de-
fault) in WebView. The attackers could inject malicious
script into WebView and exploit the opportunity to access
local resources. This can be mitigated or prevented by dis-
abling local file system access.
Warning
Table A.22: Result of AndroBugs for My Passwords
Issue Severity
ADB Backup is ENABLED for this app (default: ENABLED).
ADB Backup is a good tool for backing up all of your files. If
it’s open for this app, people who have your phone can copy
all of the sensitive data for this app in your phone (Prerequi-
site: 1.Unlock phone’s screen 2.Open the developer mode).
The sensitive data may include lifetime access token, user-
name or password, etc.
Notice
This app is using Android SQLite databases but it’s ”NOT”
suffering from SQLite Journal Information Disclosure Vul-
nerability.
Notice
Everything you delete may be recovered by any user or at-
tacker, especially rooted devices. Please make sure do not
use ”file.delete()” to delete essential files.
Notice
This app is using the Internet via HTTP protocol. Info






Found Base64 encoding ”String(s)” (Total: 2). We cannot
guarantee all of the Strings are Base64 encoding and also
we will not show you the decoded binary file.
Critical
Security issues ”MODE_WORLD_READABLE” or
”MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE” found.
Critical
To ensure your app is secure, always use an explicit intent
when starting a Service and DO NOT declare intent filters
for your services. Using an implicit intent to start a service
is a security hazard because you cannot be certain what
service will respond to the intent, and the user cannot see
which service starts.
Critical
URLs that are NOT under SSL (Total:6). Critical
This app should only be released and signed by device man-
ufacturer or Google and put under ”/system/app”. If not, it
may be a malicious app.
Critical
Table A.24: Result of AndroBugs for Always on AMOLED
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Issue Severity
External storage access found (Remember DO NOT write
important files to external storage)
Warning
Found ”exported” components(except for Launcher) for re-
ceiving outside applications actions (AndroidManifest.xml).
These components can be initialised by other apps. You
should add or modify the attribute to [exported=”false”] if
you don’t want to. You can also protect it with a customised
permission with ”signature” or higher protection Level and
specify in ”android:permission” attribute.
Warning
This app has code getting the 64-bit number ”Set-
tings.Secure.ANDROID_ID”. ANDROID_ID seems a good
choice for a unique device identifier. There are downsides:
First, it is not 100% reliable on releases of Android prior
to 2.2 (Froyo). Also, there has been at least one widely-
observed bug in a popular handset from a major manufac-
turer, where every instance has the same ANDROID_ID. If
you want to get an unique id for the device, we suggest you
use ”Installation” framework in the following article.
Warning
Found ”setAllowFileAccess(true)” or not set(enabled by de-
fault) in WebView. The attackers could inject malicious
script into WebView and exploit the opportunity to access
local resources. This can be mitigated or prevented by dis-
abling local file system access.
Warning




ADB Backup is ENABLED for this app (default: ENABLED).
ADB Backup is a good tool for backing up all of your files. If
it’s open for this app, people who have your phone can copy
all of the sensitive data for this app in your phone (Prerequi-
site: 1.Unlock phone’s screen 2.Open the developer mode).
The sensitive data may include lifetime access token, user-
name or password, etc.
Notice
The app may has the code checking for ”root” permission,
mounting file system operations or monitoring system.
Notice
This app is using Android SQLite databases but it’s ”NOT”
suffering from SQLite Journal Information Disclosure Vul-
nerability.
Notice
Everything you delete may be recovered by any user or at-
tacker, especially rooted devices.Please make sure do not
use ”file.delete()” to delete essential files.
Notice
Found codes for checking ”Application-
Info.FLAG_DEBUGGABLE” in AndroidManifest.xml
Notice
This app is using the Internet via HTTP protocol. info
Table A.26: Result of AndroBugs for Always on AMOLED
Flashlight
Issue Severity
App Sandbox Permission Checking: Secu-
rity issues ”MODE_WORLD_READABLE” or
”MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE” found
Critical
SSL Connection Checking: URLs that are NOT under SSL
(Total:2)
Critical
WebView RCE Vulnerability Checking: Found a critical We-
bView ”addJavascriptInterface” vulnerability. This method
can be used to allow JavaScript to control the host applica-
tion. This is a powerful feature, but also presents a security
risk for applications targeted to API level JELLY_BEAN(4.2)
or below, because JavaScript could use reflection to access
an injected object’s public fields. Use of this method in a
Web-view containing untrusted content could allow an at-
tacker to manipulate the host application in unintended
ways, executing Java code with the permissions of the host
application.
Critical
Table A.27: Result of AndroBugs for Flashlight
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Issue Severity
Dynamic code loading(DexClassLoader) found Warning
External storage access found (Remember DO NOT write
important files to external storage)
Warning
This app has code getting the 64-bit number ”Set-
tings.Secure.ANDROID_ID”. ANDROID_ID seems a good
choice for a unique device identifier. There are downsides:
First, it is not 100% reliable on releases of Android prior
to 2.2 (Froyo). Also, there has been at least one widely-
observed bug in a popular handset from a major manufac-
turer, where every instance has the same ANDROID_ID.
Warning
Found ”setAllowFileAccess(true)” or not set(enabled by de-
fault) in Web-view. The attackers could inject malicious
script into Web-view and exploit the opportunity to access
local resources. This can be mitigated or prevented by dis-
abling local file system access.
Warning
Found ”setJavaScriptEnabled(true)” in WebView, which
could exposed to potential XSS attacks. Please check the
web page code carefully and sanitise the output.
Warning
Table A.28: Result of AndroBugs for Flashlight
Issue Severity
ADB Backup is ENABLED for this app (default: ENABLED).
ADB Backup is a good tool for backing up all of your files. If
it’s open for this app, people who have your phone can copy
all of the sensitive data for this app in your phone (Prerequi-
site: 1.Unlock phone’s screen 2.Open the developer mode).
The sensitive data may include lifetime access token, user-
name or password, etc.
Notice
This app is using Android SQLite databases. Prior to An-
droid 4.0, Android has SQLite Journal Information Disclo-
sure Vulnerability. But it can only be solved by users up-
grading to Android > 4.0 and YOU CANNOT SOLVE IT BY
YOURSELF (But you can encrypt your databases and Jour-
nals by ”SQLCipher” or other libs).
Notice
Everything you delete may be recovered by any user or at-
tacker, especially rooted devices. Please make sure do not
use ”file.delete()” to delete essential files.
Notice
This app is using the Internet via HTTP protocol. Info
















INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
Table B.1: Result of EviCheck for MB Way
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Permission Meaning
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Allows an app to access precise loca-
tion.
CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE Allows an application to change
whether an application component
(other than its own) is enabled or not.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
WAKE_LOCK Allows using PowerManager Wake-
Locks to keep processor from sleeping
or screen from dimming.
READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the
user’s contacts data.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access informa-
tion about networks.
GET_ACCOUNTS Allows access to the list of accounts in
the Accounts Service.




CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE Allows an application to change
whether an application component
(other than its own) is enabled or not.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the
user’s contacts data.





READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the user’s contacts data.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about net-
works.




CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about net-
works.
READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the user’s contacts data.
INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
WAKE_LOCK Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep pro-
cessor from sleeping or screen from dimming.
Table B.5: Result of EviCheck for Clash-Royale
Millionaire 2018
Permission Meaning
READ_PHONE_State AAllows read only access to phone state, including the phone
number of the device, current cellular network information,
the status of any ongoing calls, and a list of any PhoneAccounts
registered on the device.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the user’s contacts data.
WAKE_LOCK Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor
from sleeping or screen from dimming.
Table B.6: Result of EviCheck for Millionaire 2018
105




GET_TASKS This constant was deprecated in API level 21. No
longer enforced.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about net-
works.
DISABLE_KEYGUARD Allows applications to disable the keyguard if it is not
secure.
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Allows an app to access precise location.
READ_LOGS Allows an application to read the low-level system log
files.
READ_PHONE_State AAllows read only access to phone state, including the
phone number of the device, current cellular network
information, the status of any ongoing calls, and a list
of any PhoneAccounts registered on the device.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Allows applications to access information about Wi-Fi
networks.
CAMERA Required to be able to access the camera device.
WAKE_LOCK Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep pro-
cessor from sleeping or screen from dimming.
INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets.
Table B.7: Result of EviCheck for LOCKit
My Passwords - Password Manager
Permission Meaning
READ_CONTACTS Allows an application to read the user’s con-
tacts data.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES Allows an application to call killBackground-
Processes(String).






WAKE_LOCK Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep pro-
cessor from sleeping or screen from dimming.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Allows applications to access information about net-
works.
CAMERA Required to be able to access the camera device.
READ_LOGS Allows an application to read the low-level system log
files.
INTERNET Allows applications to open network sockets.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
WRITE_SETTINGS Allows an application to read or write the system set-
tings.
Table B.9: Result of EviCheck for Always on AMOLED
Flashlight
Permission Meaning
WAKE_LOCK Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from sleep-
ing or screen from dimming.
CAMERA Required to be able to access the camera device.


















INTERNET Allows applications to open network sock-
ets.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
RECEIVE Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE View network status.
C2D_MESSAGE Allows cloud to device messaging.
WAKE_LOCK Prevent phone from sleeping.
WRITE_SETTINGS modify global system settings
READ_CONTACTS Read contact data.
GET_ACCOUNTS Discover known accounts.
Table C.1: Result of Mobile Security Framework for MB Way
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Manifest Analysis
Issue Description
Application Data can be Backed up This flag allows anyone to backup your
application data via adb. It allows users
who have enabled USB debugging to copy
application data off of the device.
Table C.2: Result of Mobile Security Framework for MB Way
Code Analysis
Issue Severity
This App uses Java Hash Code. It’s a weak
hash function and should never be used in
Secure Crypto Implementation.
High
App uses SQLite Database and execute
raw SQL query. Untrusted user input in
raw SQL queries can cause SQL Injection.
Also sensitive information should be en-
crypted and written to the database.
High
The App uses an insecure Random Num-
ber Generator.
High
SHA-1 is a weak hash known to have hash
collisions.
High
The App logs information. Sensitive infor-
mation should never be logged.
Info
This App copies data to clipboard. Sensi-
tive data should not be copied to clipboard
as other applications can access it.
Info






READ_GSERVICES Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
USE_CREDENTIALS Allows an application to request authenti-
cation tokens.
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE View Wi-Fi status.
INTERNET Allows applications to open network sock-
ets.
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Access coarse location sources, such as the
mobile network database, to determine an
approximate phone location, where avail-
able. Malicious applications can use this
to determine approximately where you
are.
BLUETOOTH Allows an application to view configura-
tion of the local Bluetooth phone and to
make and accept connections with paired
devices.
UNINSTALL_SHORTCUT Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
BILLING Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Access fine location sources, such as the
Global Positioning System on the phone,
where available. Malicious applications
can use this to determine where you
are and may consume additional battery
power.
GET_ACCOUNTS Discover known accounts.
INSTALL_SHORTCUT Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
MAPS_RECEIVE Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
RECEIVE Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE View network status.
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to the SD
card.
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to read from SD
Card.
Table C.4: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Wallet
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Permission Meaning
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED Automatically start at boot.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
WAKE_LOCK Prevent phone from sleeping.
ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION Unknown permission from android refer-
ence
CAMERA Allows application to take pictures and
videos with the camera. This allows the
application to collect images that the cam-
era is seeing at any time.
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows an application to connect to and
disconnect from Wi-Fi access points and
to make changes to configured Wi-Fi net-
works.
READ_CONTACTS Read contact data.
READ_PROFILE Allows an application to read the user’s
personal profile data.
Table C.5: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Wallet
Manifest Analysis
Issue Description
Activity is not Protected. An Activity is found to be shared with
other apps on the device therefore leav-
ing it accessible to any other application
on the device. The presence of intent-filter
indicates that the Activity is explicitly ex-
ported.
Broadcast Receiver is not Protected A Broadcast Receiver is found to be shared
with other apps on the device therefore
leaving it accessible to any other applica-
tion on the device. The presence of intent-
filter indicates that the Broadcast Receiver
is explicitly exported.




Service is not Protected A Service is found to be shared with other
apps on the device therefore leaving it ac-
cessible to any other application on the
device. The presence of intent-filter in-
dicates that the Service is explicitly ex-
ported.
Service is protected by a permission, but
the protection level of the permission
should be checked.
A Service is found to be shared with other
apps on the device therefore leaving it ac-
cessible to any other application on the de-
vice. It is protected by a permission which
is not defined in the analysed application.
As a result, the protection level of the per-
mission should be checked where it is de-
fined. If it is set to normal or dangerous, a
malicious application can request and ob-
tain the permission and interact with the
component. If it is set to signature, only
applications signed with the same certifi-
cate can obtain the permission.
Table C.7: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Wallet
Code Analysis
Issue Severity
This App uses Java Hash Code. It’s a weak
hash function and should never be used in
Secure Crypto Implementation.
High
App uses SQLite Database and execute
raw SQL query. Untrusted user input in
raw SQL queries can cause SQL Injection.
Also sensitive information should be en-
crypted and written to the database.
High
App can read/write to External Storage.
Any App can read data written to External
Storage.
High
Files may contain hardcoded sensitive in-
formations like usernames, passwords,
keys etc.
High
Table C.8: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Wallet
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Issue Severity
SHA-1 is a weak hash known to have hash
collisions.
High
App creates temp file. Sensitive informa-
tion should never be written into a temp
file.
High
MD5 is a weak hash known to have hash
collisions.
High
The App uses an insecure Random Num-
ber Generator.
High
Insecure WebView Implementation. Exe-
cution of user controlled code in WebView
is a critical Security Hole.
Warning
IP Address disclosure Warning
The App logs information. Sensitive infor-
mation should never be logged.
Info





INTERNET Allows applications to open network sock-
ets.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE View network status.
BILLING Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
SET_ALARM set alarm in alarm clock.
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED Automatically start at boot.





Activity is not Protected. An Activity is found to be shared with
other apps on the device therefore leav-
ing it accessible to any other application
on the device. The presence of intent-filter
indicates that the Activity is explicitly ex-
ported.
Application Data can be Backed up This flag allows anyone to backup your
application data via adb. It allows users
who have enabled USB debugging to copy
application data off of the device.
Broadcast Receiver is not Protected A Broadcast Receiver is found to be shared
with other apps on the device therefore
leaving it accessible to any other applica-
tion on the device. The presence of intent-
filter indicates that the Broadcast Receiver
is explicitly exported.
Table C.11: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Drink Water
Code Analysis
Issue Severity
App uses SQLite Database and execute
raw SQL query. Untrusted user input in
raw SQL queries can cause SQL Injection.
Also sensitive information should be en-
crypted and written to the database.
High
The App uses an insecure Random Num-
ber Generator.
High
Files may contain hardcoded sensitive in-
formations like usernames, passwords,
keys etc.
High
The App uses ECB mode in Cryptographic
encryption algorithm. ECB mode is
known to be weak as it results in the same
ciphertext for identical blocks of plain-
text.
High
Table C.12: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Drink Water
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Issue Severity
MD5 is a weak hash known to have hash
collisions.
High
The App logs information. Sensitive infor-
mation should never be logged.
Info




WRITE_SETTINGS modify global system settings
READ_GSERVICES Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Access coarse location sources, such as the
mobile network database, to determine an
approximate phone location, where avail-
able. Malicious applications can use this
to determine approximately where you
are.
CHANGE_BADGE Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
INTERNET Allows applications to open network sock-
ets.
WRITE Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
BILLING Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Access fine location sources, such as the
Global Positioning System on the phone,
where available. Malicious applications
can use this to determine where you
are and may consume additional battery
power.
REORDER_TASKS Allows an application to move tasks to the
foreground and background. Malicious
applications can force themselves to the
front without your control.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE View network status.
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to the SD
card.




RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED Automatically start at boot.
C2D_MESSAGE Allows cloud to device messaging.
GET_ACCOUNTS Discover known accounts.
WAKE_LOCK Prevent phone from sleeping.
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE View Wi-Fi status.
READ_CONTACTS Read contact data.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
Table C.15: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Freelectics Bodyweight
Manifest Analysis
Issue Description
Activity is not Protected. An Activity is found to be shared with
other apps on the device therefore leav-
ing it accessible to any other application
on the device. The presence of intent-filter
indicates that the Activity is explicitly ex-
ported.
Broadcast Receiver is not Protected A Broadcast Receiver is found to be shared
with other apps on the device therefore
leaving it accessible to any other applica-
tion on the device. The presence of intent-
filter indicates that the Broadcast Receiver
is explicitly exported.
Service is protected by a permission, but
the protection level of the permission
should be checked.
A Service is found to be shared with other
apps on the device therefore leaving it ac-
cessible to any other application on the de-
vice. It is protected by a permission which
is not defined in the analysed application.
As a result, the protection level of the per-
mission should be checked where it is de-
fined. If it is set to normal or dangerous, a
malicious application can request and ob-
tain the permission and interact with the
component. If it is set to signature, only
applications signed with the same certifi-
cate can obtain the permission.
Table C.16: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Freelectics Bodyweight
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VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
C2D_MESSAGE Allows cloud to device messaging.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE View network status.
RECEIVE Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
WAKE_LOCK Prevent phone from sleeping.
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows an application to connect to and
disconnect from Wi-Fi access points and
to make changes to configured Wi-Fi net-
works.
INTERNET Allows applications to open network sock-
ets.
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to the SD
card.
BILLING Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
Table C.17: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Clash-Royale
Manifest Analysis
Issue Description
Application Data can be Backed up This flag allows anyone to backup your
application data via adb. It allows users
who have enabled USB debugging to copy
application data off of the device.
Broadcast Receiver is not Protected A Broadcast Receiver is found to be shared
with other apps on the device therefore
leaving it accessible to any other applica-
tion on the device. The presence of intent-
filter indicates that the Broadcast Receiver
is explicitly exported.





This App uses Java Hash Code. It’s a weak
hash function and should never be used in
Secure Crypto Implementation.
High
App uses SQLite Database and execute
raw SQL query. Untrusted user input in
raw SQL queries can cause SQL Injection.
Also sensitive information should be en-
crypted and written to the database.
High
App can read/write to External Storage.
Any App can read data written to External
Storage.
High
Files may contain hardcoded sensitive in-
formations like usernames, passwords,
keys etc.
High
The App logs information. Sensitive infor-
mation should never be logged.
Info
The App uses ECB mode in Cryptographic
encryption algorithm. ECB mode is
known to be weak as it results in the same
ciphertext for identical blocks of plain-
text.
High
SHA-1 is a weak hash known to have hash
collisions.
High
This App copies data to clipboard. Sensi-
tive data should not be copied to clipboard
as other applications can access it.
Info
The App uses an insecure Random Num-
ber Generator.
High
SHA-1 is a weak hash known to have hash
collisions.
High
MD5 is a weak hash known to have hash
collisions.
High
Insecure WebView Implementation. Exe-
cution of user controlled code in WebView
is a critical Security Hole.
Warning
Table C.19: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Clash-Royale
119




INTERNET Allows applications to open network sock-
ets.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE View network status.
Table C.20: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Millionaire 2018
Manifest Analysis
Issue Description
Activity is not Protected. An Activity is found to be shared with
other apps on the device therefore leav-
ing it accessible to any other application
on the device. The presence of intent-filter
indicates that the Activity is explicitly ex-
ported.
Application Data can be Backed up This flag allows anyone to backup your
application data via adb. It allows users
who have enabled USB debugging to copy
application data off of the device.
Service is protected by a permission, but
the protection level of the permission
should be checked.
A Service is found to be shared with other
apps on the device therefore leaving it ac-
cessible to any other application on the de-
vice. It is protected by a permission which
is not defined in the analysed application.
As a result, the protection level of the per-
mission should be checked where it is de-
fined. If it is set to normal or dangerous, a
malicious application can request and ob-
tain the permission and interact with the
component. If it is set to signature, only
applications signed with the same certifi-
cate can obtain the permission.





This App uses Java Hash Code. It’s a weak
hash function and should never be used in
Secure Crypto Implementation.
High
The App uses an insecure Random Num-
ber Generator.
High
Files may contain hardcoded sensitive in-
formations like usernames, passwords,
keys etc.
High
The App logs information. Sensitive infor-
mation should never be logged.
Info
SHA-1 is a weak hash known to have hash
collisions.
High
IP Address disclosure Warning
This App may have root detection capabil-
ities.
Secure
Insecure WebView Implementation. Exe-
cution of user controlled code in WebView
is a critical Security Hole.
Warning
MD5 is a weak hash known to have hash
collisions.
High
Table C.22: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Millionaire 2018
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CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE Allows an application to change the state
of network connectivity.
DISABLE_KEYGUARD Allows an application to disable the key
lock and any associated password security.
A legitimate example of this is the phone
disabling the key lock when receiving an
incoming phone call, then re-enabling the
key lock when the call is finished.
READ_LOGS Allows an application to read from the sys-
tem’s various log files. This allows it to
discover general information about what
you are doing with the phone, potentially
including personal or private information.
CAMERA Allows application to take pictures and
videos with the camera. This allows the
application to collect images that the cam-
era is seeing at any time.
INTERNET Allows applications to open network sock-
ets.
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR Allows application to expand or collapse
the status bar.
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Access fine location sources, such as the
Global Positioning System on the phone,
where available. Malicious applications
can use this to determine where you
are and may consume additional battery
power.
WAKE_LOCK Prevent phone from sleeping.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE View network status.
GET_TASKS Allows application to retrieve informa-
tion about currently and recently running
tasks. May allow malicious applications to
discover private information about other
applications.
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to write to the SD
card.
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Allows an application to read from SD
Card.




RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED Automatically start at boot.
BROADCAST_STICKY Allows an application to send sticky
broadcasts, which remain after the broad-
cast ends. Malicious applications can
make the phone slow or unstable by caus-
ing it to use too much memory.
WRITE_SETTINGS modify global system settings
FLASHLIGHT Allows the application to control the flash-
light
READ_PHONE_STATE read phone state and identity
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW lows an application to show system-alert
windows. Malicious applications can take
over the entire screen of the phone.
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES Allows an application to kill background
processes of other applications, even if
memory is not low.
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE View Wi-Fi status.
PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS Allows the modification of collected com-
ponent usage statistics. Not for use by
common applications.
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Allows an application to connect to and
disconnect from Wi-Fi access points and
to make changes to configured Wi-Fi net-
works.
MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS Allows the application to mount and un-
mount file systems for removable storage.
Table C.24: Result of Mobile Security Framework for LOCKit
Manifest Analysis
Issue Description
Application Data can be Backed up This flag allows anyone to backup your
application data via adb. It allows users
who have enabled USB debugging to copy
application data off of the device.
Table C.25: Result of Mobile Security Framework for LOCKit
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Issue Description
Activity is not Protected. An Activity is found to be shared with
other apps on the device therefore leav-
ing it accessible to any other application
on the device. The presence of intent-filter
indicates that the Activity is explicitly ex-
ported.
Broadcast Receiver is not Protected A Broadcast Receiver is found to be shared
with other apps on the device therefore
leaving it accessible to any other applica-
tion on the device. The presence of intent-
filter indicates that the Broadcast Receiver
is explicitly exported.





DISABLE_KEYGUARD Allows an application to disable the key
lock and any associated password security.
A legitimate example of this is the phone
disabling the key lock when receiving an
incoming phone call, then re-enabling the
key lock when the call is finished.
DUMP Allows application to retrieve internal sta-
tus of the system. Malicious applications
may retrieve a wide variety of private and
secure information that they should never
commonly need.
DEVICE_POWER Allows the application to turn the phone
on or off.
INTERNET Allows applications to open network sock-
ets.
CHANGE_CONFIGURATION Allows an application to change the cur-
rent configuration, such as the locale or
overall font size.
PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS Allows the modification of collected com-
ponent usage statistics. Not for use by
common applications.




BILLING Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
RECEIVE Unknown permission from android refer-
ence.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE View network status.
GET_TASKS Allows application to retrieve informa-
tion about currently and recently running
tasks. May allow malicious applications to
discover private information about other
applications.
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED Automatically start at boot.
BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN Allows the holder to send intents to a
device administrator. Should never be
needed for common applications.
WRITE_SETTINGS modify global system settings
READ_PHONE_STATE read phone state and identity
C2D_MESSAGE Allows cloud to device messaging.
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS Allows an application to modify the sys-
tem’s secure settings data. Not for use by
common applications.
VIBRATE Allows access to the vibrator.
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW lows an application to show system-alert
windows. Malicious applications can take
over the entire screen of the phone.
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES Allows an application to kill background
processes of other applications, even if
memory is not low.
CAMERA Allows application to take pictures and
videos with the camera. This allows the
application to collect images that the cam-
era is seeing at any time.
WAKE_LOCK Prevent phone from sleeping.
Table C.28: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Always on AMOLED
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Manifest Analysis
Issue Description
Application Data can be Backed up This flag allows anyone to backup your
application data via adb. It allows users
who have enabled USB debugging to copy
application data off of the device.
Activity is not Protected. An Activity is found to be shared with
other apps on the device therefore leav-
ing it accessible to any other application
on the device. The presence of intent-filter
indicates that the Activity is explicitly ex-
ported.
Broadcast Receiver is not Protected A Broadcast Receiver is found to be shared
with other apps on the device therefore
leaving it accessible to any other applica-
tion on the device. The presence of intent-
filter indicates that the Broadcast Receiver
is explicitly exported.
Service is not Protected A Service is found to be shared with other
apps on the device therefore leaving it ac-
cessible to any other application on the
device. The presence of intent-filter in-
dicates that the Service is explicitly ex-
ported.
Table C.29: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Always on AMOLED
Code Analysis
Issue Severity
This App uses Java Hash Code. It’s a weak
hash function and should never be used in
Secure Crypto Implementation.
High
The App uses an insecure Random Num-
ber Generator.
High
The App logs information. Sensitive infor-
mation should never be logged.
Info






WAKE_LOCK Prevent phone from sleeping.
CAMERA Allows application to take pictures and
videos with the camera. This allows the
application to collect images that the cam-
era is seeing at any time.
FLASHLIGHT Allows the application to control the flash-
light
INTERNET Allows applications to open network sock-
ets.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE View network status.
Table C.31: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Flashlight
Manifest Analysis
Issue Description
Application Data can be Backed up This flag allows anyone to backup your
application data via adb. It allows users
who have enabled USB debugging to copy
application data off of the device.
Broadcast Receiver is not Protected A Broadcast Receiver is found to be shared
with other apps on the device therefore
leaving it accessible to any other applica-
tion on the device. The presence of intent-
filter indicates that the Broadcast Receiver
is explicitly exported.
Table C.32: Result of Mobile Security Framework for Flashlight
Code Analysis
Issue Severity
The App logs information. Sensitive infor-
mation should never be logged.
Info


















Backups enabled: Potential for data theft via local attacks
via adb backup, if the device has USB debugging enabled
(not common).
Warning
Table D.1: Result of Qark for MB Way
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Analysis to App Components
Issue Severity
The following receiver are exported and protected by a per-
mission, but the permission can be obtained by malicious
apps installed prior to this one.
Warning
The following activity are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect activity could leave them
vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The activity should
be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and infor-
mation leakage.
Warning
Table D.2: Result of Qark for MB Way
Analysis to Crypto Bugs
Issue Severity
setSeed should not be called with SecureRandom, as it is
insecure. Specifying a fixed seed will cause the instance
to return a predictable sequence of numbers. This may be
useful for testing but it is not appropriate for secure use.
Potential Vulnerability
generateSeed should not be called with SecureRandom, as
it is insecure. Specifying a fixed seed will cause the instance
to return a predictable sequence of numbers. This may be
useful for testing but it is not appropriate for secure use.
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.3: Result of Qark for MB Way
Analysis to Pending Intents
Issue Severity
Empty Pending instance found. For security reasons, the In-
tent you supply here should almost always be an explicit in-
tent that is specify an explicit component to be delivered to
through Intent.setClass. A malicious application could po-
tentially intercept, redirect and/or modify this Intent. Pend-
ing Intents retain the UID of your application and all related
permissions, allowing another application to act as yours.
Warning
Table D.4: Result of Qark for MB Way
130
D.1. TESTED APKS
Analysis to Plugin Issues
Issue Severity
Application dynamically registers a broadcast receiver Ap-
plication that register a broadcast receiver dynamically is
vulnerable to granting unrestricted access to the broadcast
receiver. The receiver will be called with any broadcast In-
tent that matches filter.
Warning
The Content provider API provides a method call The
framework does no permission checking on this entry into
the content provider besides the basic ability for the applica-
tion to get access to the provider at all. Any implementation
of this method must do its own permission checks on incom-
ing calls to make sure they are allowed.Failure to do so will
allow unauthorized components to interact with the content
provider.
Info
Verbose logs are detected This may allow potential leakage
of information from Android applications. Verbose logs
should never be compiled into an application except during
development.
Info
Debug logs are detected This may allow potential leakage of
information from Android applications. Debug logs should
never be compiled into an application except during devel-
opment.
Info
Table D.5: Result of Qark for MB Way
Wallet
Analysis to App Components
Issue Severity
The following receiver are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect receiver could leave
them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The receiver
should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and
information leakage.
Warning
The following receiver are exported and protected by a per-
mission, but the permission can be obtained by malicious
apps installed prior to this one.
Warning
Table D.6: Result of Qark for Wallet
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Analysis to X.509 Issues
Issue Severity
Instance of checkServerTrusted, with no body found. This
means this application is likely vulnerable to Man-In-The-
Middle attacks.
Warning
Table D.7: Result of Qark for Wallet
Analysis to Crypto Bugs
Issue Severity
getInstance should not be called with ECB as the cipher
mode, as it is insecure
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.8: Result of Qark for Wallet
Analysis to Pending Intents
Issue Severity
Implicit Intent: localIntent used to create instance of
PendingIntent. A malicious application could potentially
intercept, redirect and/or modify (in a limited manner) this
Intent. Pending Intents retain the UID of your application
and all related permissions, allowing another application to
act as yours.
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.9: Result of Qark for Wallet
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D.1. TESTED APKS
Analysis to Plugin Issues
Issue Severity
Reading files stored on External Storage makes it vul-
nerable to data injection attacks Note that this code
does no error checking and there is no security enforced
with these files. For example, any application holding
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE can write to these files.
Warning
Application dynamically registers a broadcast receiver Ap-
plication that register a broadcast receiver dynamically is
vulnerable to granting unrestricted access to the broadcast
receiver. The receiver will be called with any broadcast In-
tent that matches filter.
Warning
The Content provider API provides a method call The
framework does no permission checking on this entry into
the content provider besides the basic ability for the applica-
tion to get access to the provider at all. Any implementation
of this method must do its own permission checks on incom-
ing calls to make sure they are allowed.Failure to do so will
allow unauthorised components to interact with the content
provider.
Info
Verbose logs are detected This may allow potential leakage
of information from Android applications. Verbose logs
should never be compiled into an application except during
development.
Info
Application dynamically loads an external class through
DexClassLoader Filepat.
Info
File System Access is by default enabled setAllowFileAc-
cess() and setAllowContentAccess() are by default true.
This should be set to false to restrict access to local data
since it is used to display content from locally stored HTML
or fetch HTML and other content from the server.
Info
Application contains hardcoded http url Info
Table D.10: Result of Qark for Wallet
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Issue Severity
Debug logs are detected This may allow potential leakage of
information from Android applications. Debug logs should
never be compiled into an application except during devel-
opment.
Info
Be careful with use of Check permission function App
maybe vulnerable to Privilege escalation or Confused
Deputy Attack. This function can grant access to malicious
application, lacking the appropriate permission, by assum-
ing your applications permissions. This means a malicious
application, without appropriate permissions, can bypass
its permission check by using your application permission
to get access to otherwise denied resources. Use - checkCall-
ingPermission instead.
Info
Table D.11: Result of Qark for Wallet
D.1.2 In-app Purchases
Drink Water
Analysis to App Components
Issue Severity
The following receiver are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect receiver could leave
them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The receiver
should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and
information leakage.
Warning
Table D.12: Result of Qark for Drink Water
Analysis to Crypto Bugs
Issue Severity
getInstance should not be called with ECB as the cipher
mode, as it is insecure
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.13: Result of Qark for Drink Water
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Analysis to Pending Intents
Issue Severity
Implicit Intent: localIntent used to create instance of
PendingIntent. A malicious application could potentially
intercept, redirect and/or modify (in a limited manner) this
Intent. Pending Intents retain the UID of your application
and all related permissions, allowing another application to
act as yours.
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.14: Result of Qark for Drink Water
Analysis to Plugin Issues
Issue Severity
Reading files stored on External Storage makes it vul-
nerable to data injection attacks Note that this code
does no error checking and there is no security enforced
with these files. For example, any application holding
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE can write to these files.
Warning
Improper implementation of shouldInterceptRequest
method Returning null allows any URL to load in the
web-view.
Warning
Application dynamically registers a broadcast receiver Ap-
plication that register a broadcast receiver dynamically is
vulnerable to granting unrestricted access to the broadcast
receiver. The receiver will be called with any broadcast In-
tent that matches filter.
Warning
Verbose logs are detected This may allow potential leakage
of information from Android applications. Verbose logs
should never be compiled into an application except during
development.
Info
Application dynamically loads an external class through
DexClassLoader Filepat.
Info
File System Access is by default enabled setAllowFileAc-
cess() and setAllowContentAccess() are by default true.
This should be set to false to restrict access to local data
since it is used to display content from locally stored HTML
or fetch HTML and other content from the server.
Info
Table D.15: Result of Qark for Drink Water
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Issue Severity
Application contains hardcoded http ur Info
Debug logs are detected This may allow potential leakage of
information from Android applications. Debug logs should
never be compiled into an application except during devel-
opment.
Info
Access of phone number or IMEI, is detected in file. Info
Table D.16: Result of Qark for Drink Water
Freelectics Bodyweight
Analysis to App Components
Issue Severity
The following receiver are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect receiver could leave
them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The receiver
should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and
information leakage.
Warning
The following receiver are exported and protected by a per-
mission, but the permission can be obtained by malicious
apps installed prior to this one.
Warning
Table D.17: Result of Qark for Freelectics Bodyweigh
Analysis to Pending Intents
Issue Severity
Implicit Intent: localIntent used to create instance of
PendingIntent. A malicious application could potentially
intercept, redirect and/or modify (in a limited manner) this
Intent. Pending Intents retain the UID of your application
and all related permissions, allowing another application to
act as yours.
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.18: Result of Qark for Freelectics Bodyweigh
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Analysis to Plugin Issues
Issue Severity
Reading files stored on External Storage makes it vul-
nerable to data injection attacks Note that this code
does no error checking and there is no security enforced
with these files. For example, any application holding
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE can write to these files.
Warning
Application dynamically registers a broadcast receiver Ap-
plication that register a broadcast receiver dynamically is
vulnerable to granting unrestricted access to the broadcast
receiver. The receiver will be called with any broadcast In-
tent that matches filter.
Warning
Improper implementation of shouldInterceptRequest
method Returning null allows any url to load in the
web-view.
Warning
Verbose logs are detected This may allow potential leakage
of information from Android applications. Verbose logs
should never be compiled into an application except during
development.
Info
Debug logs are detected This may allow potential leakage of
information from Android applications. Debug logs should
never be compiled into an application except during devel-
opment.
Info
Be careful with use of Check permission function App
maybe vulnerable to Privilege escalation or Confused
Deputy Attack. This function can grant access to malicious
application, lacking the appropriate permission, by assum-
ing your applications permissions. This means a malicious
application, without appropriate permissions, can bypass
its permission check by using your applicationpermission
to get access to otherwise denied resources. Use - checkCall-
ingPermission instead.
Info
Table D.19: Result of Qark for Freelectics Bodyweigh
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Issue Severity
The Content provider API provides a method call The
framework does no permission checking on this entry into
the content provider besides the basic ability for the applica-
tion to get access to the provider at all. Any implementation
of this method must do its own permission checks on incom-
ing calls to make sure they are allowed.Failure to do so will
allow unauthorized components to interact with the content
provider.
Info
File System Access is by default enabled setAllowFileAc-
cess() and setAllowContentAccess() are by default true.
This should be set to false to restrict access to local data
since it is used to display content from locally stored HTML
or fetch HTML and other content from the server.
Info
Table D.20: Result of Qark for Freelectics Bodyweigh
D.1.3 Games
Clash-Royale
Analysis to App Components
Issue Severity
The following receiver are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect receiver could leave
them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The receiver
should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and
information leakage.
Warning
The following receiver are exported and protected by a per-
mission, but the permission can be obtained by malicious
apps installed prior to this one. Failing to protect receiver
could leave them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps.
The receiver should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as
injection and information leakage.
Warning
The following activity are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect activity could leave them
vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The activity should
be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and infor-
mation leakage.
Warning
Table D.21: Result of Qark for Clash-Royale
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Analysis to Crypto Bugs
Issue Severity
getInstance should not be called with ECB as the cipher
mode, as it is insecure
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.22: Result of Qark for Clash-Royale
Analysis to Pending Intents
Issue Severity
Implicit Intent: localIntent used to create instance of
PendingIntent. A malicious application could potentially
intercept, redirect and/or modify (in a limited manner) this
Intent. Pending Intents retain the UID of your application
and all related permissions, allowing another application to
act as yours.
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.23: Result of Qark for Clash-Royale
Analysis to Plugin Issues
Issue Severity
Reading files stored on External Storage makes it vul-
nerable to data injection attacks Note that this code
does no error checking and there is no security enforced
with these files. For example, any application holding
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE can write to these files.
Warning
Improper implementation of shouldInterceptRequest
method Returning null allows any URL to load in the
web-view.
Warning
Application dynamically registers a broadcast receiver Ap-
plication that register a broadcast receiver dynamically is
vulnerable to granting unrestricted access to the broadcast
receiver. The receiver will be called with any broadcast In-
tent that matches filter.
Warning
Verbose logs are detected This may allow potential leakage
of information from Android applications. Verbose logs
should never be compiled into an application except during
development.
Info
Table D.24: Result of Qark for Clash-Royale
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Issue Severity
Be careful with use of Check permission function App
maybe vulnerable to Privilege escalation or Confused
Deputy Attack. This function can grant access to malicious
application, lacking the appropriate permission, by assum-
ing your applications permissions. This means a malicious
application, without appropriate permissions, can bypass
its permission check by using your application permission
to get access to otherwise denied resources. Use - checkCall-
ingPermission instead.
Info
File System Access is by default enabled setAllowFileAc-
cess() and setAllowContentAccess() are by default true.
This should be set to false to restrict access to local data
since it is used to display content from locally stored HTML
or fetch HTML and other content from the server.
Info
The Content provider API provides a method call The
framework does no permission checking on this entry into
the content provider besides the basic ability for the applica-
tion to get access to the provider at all. Any implementation
of this method must do its own permission checks on incom-
ing calls to make sure they are allowed.Failure to do so will
allow unauthorised components to interact with the content
provider.
Info
Debug logs are detected This may allow potential leakage of
information from Android applications. Debug logs should
never be compiled into an application except during devel-
opment.
Info
Table D.25: Result of Qark for Clash-Royale
Millionaire 2018
Analysis to App Components
Issue Severity
The following receiver are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect receiver could leave
them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The receiver
should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and
information leakage.
Warning
The following receiver are exported and protected by a per-
mission, but the permission can be obtained by malicious
apps installed prior to this one.
Warning
Table D.26: Result of Qark for Millionaire 2018
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Analysis to X.509 Issues
Issue Severity
Potential Man-In-The-Middle vulnerability - There appear
to be SSLSession (boolean) objects which are not checked
using the HostnameVerifier.verify method. You should man-
ually inspect these.
Warning
Table D.27: Result of Qark for Millionaire 2018
Analysis to Pending Intents
Issue Severity
Implicit Intent: localIntent used to create instance of
PendingIntent. A malicious application could potentially
intercept, redirect and/or modify (in a limited manner) this
Intent. Pending Intents retain the UID of your application
and all related permissions, allowing another application to
act as yours.
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.28: Result of Qark for Millionaire 2018
Analysis to Plugin Issues
Issue Severity
Reading files stored on External Storage makes it vul-
nerable to data injection attacks Note that this code
does no error checking and there is no security enforced
with these files. For example, any application holding
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE can write to these files.
Warning
Application dynamically registers a broadcast receiver Ap-
plication that register a broadcast receiver dynamically is
vulnerable to granting unrestricted access to the broadcast
receiver. The receiver will be called with any broadcast In-
tent that matches filter.
Warning
Table D.29: Result of Qark for Millionaire 2018
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Issue Severity
Improper implementation of shouldInterceptRequest
method Returning null allows any url to load in the
web-view.
Warning
Usage of setMixedContentMode is found In this mode, the
WebView will allow a secure origin to load content from
any other origin, even if that origin is insecure. This is the
least secure mode of operation for the WebView, and where
possible apps should not set this mode.
Warning
Verbose logs are detected This may allow potential leakage
of information from Android applications. Verbose logs
should never be compiled into an application except during
development.
Info
Debug logs are detected This may allow potential leakage of
information from Android applications. Debug logs should
never be compiled into an application except during devel-
opment.
Info
Be careful with use of Check permission function App
maybe vulnerable to Privilege escalation or Confused
Deputy Attack. This function can grant access to malicious
application, lacking the appropriate permission, by assum-
ing your applications permissions. This means a malicious
application, without appropriate permissions, can bypass
its permission check by using your applicationpermission
to get access to otherwise denied resources. Use - checkCall-
ingPermission instead.
Info
The Content provider API provides a method call The
framework does no permission checking on this entry into
the content provider besides the basic ability for the applica-
tion to get access to the provider at all. Any implementation
of this method must do its own permission checks on incom-
ing calls to make sure they are allowed.Failure to do so will
allow unauthorized components to interact with the content
provider.
Info




File System Access is by default enabled setAllowFileAc-
cess() and setAllowContentAccess() are by default true.
This should be set to false to restrict access to local data
since it is used to display content from locally stored HTML
or fetch HTML and other content from the server.
Info
Application dynamically loads an external class through
DexClassLoader.Even though this may not be a security is-
sue always, be careful with what you are loading.
Info





Backups enabled: Potential for data theft via local attacks
via adb backup, if the device has USB debugging enabled
(not common).
Warning
Table D.32: Result of Qark for LOCKit
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Analysis to App Components
Issue Severity
The following receiver are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect receiver could leave
them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The receiver
should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and
information leakage.
Warning
The following receiver are exported and protected by a per-
mission, but the permission can be obtained by malicious
apps installed prior to this one.
Warning
The following service are exported and protected by a per-
mission, but the permission can be obtained by malicious
apps installed prior to this one.
Warning
The following activity-alias are exported, but not protected
by any permissions. Failing to protect activity-alias could
leave them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The
activity-alias should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as
injection and information leakage.
Warning
The following activity are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect activity could leave them
vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The activity should
be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and infor-
mation leakage.
Warning
These are exported, but the associated Intents can only be
sent by SYSTEM level apps. They could still potentially be




Table D.33: Result of Qark for LOCKit
Analysis to X.509 Issues
Issue Severity
Instance of checkServerTrusted, with no body found. This
means this application is likely vulnerable to Man-In-The-
Middle attacks. This can be confirmed using the free ver-
sion of Burpsuite.
Warning
Table D.34: Result of Qark for LOCKit
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D.1. TESTED APKS
Analysis to Crypto Bugs
Issue Severity
getInstance should not be called with ECB as the cipher
mode, as it is insecure.
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.35: Result of Qark for LOCKit
Analysis to Plugin Issues
Issue Severity
Reading files stored on External Storage makes it vul-
nerable to data injection attacks Note that this code
does no error checking and there is no security enforced
with these files. For example, any application holding
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE can write to these files.
Warning
Application dynamically registers a broadcast receiver Ap-
plication that register a broadcast receiver dynamically is
vulnerable to granting unrestricted access to the broadcast
receiver. The receiver will be called with any broadcast In-
tent that matches filter.
Warning
Web-view is loading http URLs If Web-view is allowing to
load clear-text content from the Internet then it would be
open to various forms of attack such as MiTM.
Warning
Access of phone number or IMEI, is detected in file Info
Verbose logs are detected This may allow potential leakage
of information from Android applications. Verbose logs
should never be compiled into an application except during
development.
Info
Debug logs are detected This may allow potential leakage of
information from Android applications. Debug logs should
never be compiled into an application except during devel-
opment.
Info
Application contains hard-coded http URL. Info
File System Access is by default enabled setAllowFileAc-
cess() and setAllowContentAccess() are by default true.
This should be set to false to restrict access to local data
since it is used to display content from locally stored HTML
or fetch HTML and other content from the server.
Info
Table D.36: Result of Qark for LOCKit
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My Passwords - Password Manager
Analysis to Manifest
Issue Severity
Backups enabled: Potential for data theft via local attacks
via adb backup, if the device has USB debugging enabled
(not common).
Warning
Table D.37: Result of Qark for My Passwords
Analysis to App Components
Issue Severity
The following receiver are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect receiver could leave
them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The receiver
should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and
information leakage.
Warning
The following receiver are exported and protected by a per-
mission, but the permission can be obtained by malicious
apps installed prior to this one.
Warning
Table D.38: Result of Qark for My Passwords
Analysis to Pending Intents
Issue Severity
Implicit Intent: localIntent used to create instance of
PendingIntent. A malicious application could potentially
intercept, redirect and/or modify (in a limited manner) this
Intent. Pending Intents retain the UID of your application
and all related permissions, allowing another application to
act as yours.
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.39: Result of Qark for My Passwords
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D.1. TESTED APKS
Analysis to Plugin Issues
Issue Severity
Reading files stored on External Storage makes it vul-
nerable to data injection attacks Note that this code
does no error checking and there is no security enforced
with these files. For example, any application holding
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE can write to these files.
Warning
Application dynamically registers a broadcast receiver Ap-
plication that register a broadcast receiver dynamically is
vulnerable to granting unrestricted access to the broadcast
receiver. The receiver will be called with any broadcast In-
tent that matches filter.
Warning
The Content provider API provides a method call The
framework does no permission checking on this entry into
the content provider besides the basic ability for the applica-
tion to get access to the provider at all. Any implementation
of this method must do its own permission checks on incom-
ing calls to make sure they are allowed.Failure to do so will
allow unauthorized components to interact with the content
provider.
Info
Verbose logs are detected This may allow potential leakage
of information from Android applications. Verbose logs
should never be compiled into an application except during
development.
Info
Debug logs are detected This may allow potential leakage of
information from Android applications. Debug logs should
never be compiled into an application except during devel-
opment.
Info
Be careful with use of Check permission function App
maybe vulnerable to Privilege escalation or Confused
Deputy Attack. This function can grant access to malicious
application, lacking the appropriate permission, by assum-
ing your applications permissions. This means a malicious
application, without appropriate permissions, can bypass
its permission check by using your applicationpermission
to get access to otherwise denied resources. Use - checkCall-
ingPermission instead.
Info
Table D.40: Result of Qark for My Passwords
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Backups enabled: Potential for data theft via local attacks
via adb backup, if the device has USB debugging enabled
(not common).
Warning
Table D.41: Result of Qark for Always on AMOLE
Analysis to App Components
Issue Severity
The following receiver are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect receiver could leave
them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The receiver
should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and
information leakage.
Warning
The following receiver are exported and protected by a per-
mission, but the permission can be obtained by malicious
apps installed prior to this one.
Warning
Table D.42: Result of Qark for Always on AMOLE
Analysis to Pending Intents
Issue Severity
Implicit Intent: localIntent used to create instance of
PendingIntent. A malicious application could potentially
intercept, redirect and/or modify (in a limited manner) this
Intent. Pending Intents retain the UID of your application
and all related permissions, allowing another application to
act as yours.
Potential Vulnerability
Table D.43: Result of Qark for Always on AMOLE
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D.1. TESTED APKS
Analysis to Plugin Issues
Issue Severity
Reading files stored on External Storage makes it vul-
nerable to data injection attacks Note that this code
does no error checking and there is no security enforced
with these files. For example, any application holding
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE can write to these files.
Warning
Application dynamically registers a broadcast receiver Ap-
plication that register a broadcast receiver dynamically is
vulnerable to granting unrestricted access to the broadcast
receiver. The receiver will be called with any broadcast In-
tent that matches filter.
Warning
Verbose logs are detected This may allow potential leakage
of information from Android applications. Verbose logs
should never be compiled into an application except during
development.
Info
Debug logs are detected This may allow potential leakage of
information from Android applications. Debug logs should
never be compiled into an application except during devel-
opment.
Info
Application contains hard-coded http URL. Info
Be careful with use of Check permission function App
maybe vulnerable to Privilege escalation or Confused
Deputy Attack. This function can grant access to malicious
application, lacking the appropriate permission, by assum-
ing your applications permissions. This means a malicious
application, without appropriate permissions, can bypass
its permission check by using your applicationpermission
to get access to otherwise denied resources. Use - checkCall-
ingPermission instead.
Info
Table D.44: Result of Qark for Always on AMOLE
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Flashlight
Analysis to App Components
Issue Severity
The following receiver are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect receiver could leave
them vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The receiver
should be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and
information leakage.
Warning
The following activity are exported, but not protected by
any permissions. Failing to protect activity could leave them
vulnerable to attack by malicious apps. The activity should
be reviewed for vulnerabilities, such as injection and infor-
mation leakage.
Warning
Table D.45: Result of Qark for Flashlight
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D.1. TESTED APKS
Analysis to Plugin Issues
Issue Severity
Usage of setMixedContentMode is found In this mode, the
WebView will allow a secure origin to load content from
any other origin, even if that origin is insecure. This is the
least secure mode of operation for the WebView, and where
possible apps should not set this mode.
Warning
Application dynamically registers a broadcast receiver Ap-
plication that register a broadcast receiver dynamically is
vulnerable to granting unrestricted access to the broadcast
receiver. The receiver will be called with any broadcast In-
tent that matches filter.
Warning
Verbose logs are detected This may allow potential leakage
of information from Android applications. Verbose logs
should never be compiled into an application except during
development.
Info
File System Access is by default enabled setAllowFileAc-
cess() and setAllowContentAccess() are by default true.
This should be set to false to restrict access to local data
since it is used to display content from locally stored HTML
or fetch HTML and other content from the server.
Info
The Content provider API provides a method call The
framework does no permission checking on this entry into
the content provider besides the basic ability for the applica-
tion to get access to the provider at all. Any implementation
of this method must do its own permission checks on incom-
ing calls to make sure they are allowed.Failure to do so will
allow unauthorized components to interact with the content
provider.
Info
Application dynamically loads an external class through
DexClassLoader. Even though this may not be a security
issue always, be careful with what you are loading.
Info
Debug logs are detected This may allow potential leakage of
information from Android applications. Debug logs should
never be compiled into an application except during devel-
opment.
Info

















This application is vulnerable to SQL injection. Any data
stored in database can be exposed as any attacker is able to
retrieve, modify and delete the stored information.
Critical vulnerability
Using weak algorithms allows an attacker to break the




This option allows backups of the application data via adb.
Malicious people with physical access could use adb to get
private data of your app into their PC.
Medium critically vul-
nerability
Exception catching should be specific. Generic Exception
type could not be safe and lead to silent error suppression.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
This method is not as random as it is supposed to be. It
should not be use to generate OTP codes.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Sensitive information should never be logged since it can
lead to that information being disclosed.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Even if the application can create its own permissions, it’s




Table E.1: Result of Super Android Analyser for MB Way
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Issue Severity
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported receiver was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported service was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
The application needs a large heap. This is not a vulnerabil-
ity as such, but could be in devices with small heap. Check
if the large heap is actually needed.
Warning





Insecure application SSL implementation. This application
accepts all certificates, including self signed by default. This
is a critical issue as Man in the Middle attacks may be per-
formed.
Critical vulnerability
This application is vulnerable to SQL injection. Any data
stored in database can be exposed as any attacker is able to
retrieve, modify and delete the stored information.
Critical vulnerability
Webview insecure implementation. This issue could allow
to a remote attacker to code execution in WebView and per-
forming Cross Site Scripting attacks.
Critical vulnerability
The application could execute system command. High critically vulnera-
bility
Applications is creating temp files. Sensitive information
should never be written in temp files.
High critically vulnera-
bility
Using weak algorithms allows an attacker to break the ci-




Application can read/write in external storage. Any app
can read data written in external storage.
High critically vulnera-
bility
The exceptions thrown by a method should be specific.
Generic Exception type could could not be safe and lead
to silent error suppression.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Exception catching should be specific. Generic Exception
type could not be safe and lead to silent error suppression.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
This method is not as random as it is supposed to be. It
should not be use to generate OTP codes.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Sleep Method is used with vars as arguments. If those vars




Sensitive information should never be logged since it can
lead to that information being disclosed.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Table E.3: Result of Super Android Analyser for Wallet
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Issue Severity
This application is using Base64 encoding. This is not a
secure method to encode data.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private email information.
Warning
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported receiver was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
The application is recording the device network operator.
This process might be performed without the user’s knowl-
edge.
Warning
The application is recording the device network operator
name. This process might be performed without the user’s
knowledge.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private IPs.
Warning
The application needs a large heap. This is not a vulnerabil-
ity as such, but could be in devices with small heap. Check
if the large heap is actually needed.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private URLs.
Warning






Using weak algorithms allows an attacker to break the ci-




This option allows backups of the application data via adb.
Malicious people with physical access could use adb to get
private data of your app into their PC.
Medium critically vul-
nerability
The exceptions thrown by a method should be specific.
Generic Exception type could could not be safe and lead
to silent error suppression.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Exception catching should be specific. Generic Exception
type could not be safe and lead to silent error suppression
Low critically vulnera-
bility
This method is not as random as it is supposed to be. It
should not be use to generate OTP codes.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Sensitive information should never be logged since it can
lead to that information being disclosed.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Table E.5: Result of Super Android Analyser for Drink Water
Issue Severity
The This application is using Base64 encoding and decod-
ing. This is not a secure method to encode data.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of hard-coded certificate or key-store.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private email information.
Warning
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported receiver was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
The application is recording the device network operator.
This process might be performed without the user’s knowl-
edge.
Warning
The application is recording the SIM serial. This process
might be performed without the user’s knowledge.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private URLs.
Warning
Table E.6: Result of Super Android Analyser for Drink Water
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Freelectics Bodyweight
Issue Severity
Applications is creating temp files. Sensitive information
should never be written in temp files.
High critically vulnera-
bility
Using weak algorithms allows an attacker to break the ci-




Application can read/write in external storage. Any app
can read data written in external storage.
High critically vulnera-
bility
The exceptions thrown by a method should be specific.
Generic Exception type could could not be safe and lead
to silent error suppression.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Exception catching should be specific. Generic Exception
type could not be safe and lead to silent error suppression
Low critically vulnera-
bility
This method is not as random as it is supposed to be. It
should not be use to generate OTP codes.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Sleep Method is used with vars as arguments. If those vars




Sensitive information should never be logged since it can
lead to that information being disclosed.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Even if the application can create its own permissions, it’s








This application is using Base64 decoding. Warnings
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private email information.
Warnings
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warnings
Exported receiver was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warnings
Exported service was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warnings
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private IPs.
Warnings
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private URLs.
Warnings




Webview insecure implementation. This issue could allow
to a remote attacker to code execution in WebView and per-
forming Cross Site Scripting attacks.
Critical vulnerability
Using weak algorithms allows an attacker to break the ci-




Application can read/write in external storage. Any app
can read data written in external storage.
High critically vulnera-
bility
Exception catching should be specific. Generic Exception
type could not be safe and lead to silent error suppression
Low critically vulnera-
bility
This method is not as random as it is supposed to be. It
should not be use to generate OTP codes.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Sensitive information should never be logged since it can
lead to that information being disclosed.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Table E.9: Result of Super Android Analyser for Clash-Royale
159
APPENDIX E. RESULTS OF SUPER ANDROID ANALYSER
Issue Severity
The This application is using Base64 encoding and decod-
ing. This is not a secure method to encode data.
Warning
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported receiver was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private IPs.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private URLs.
Warning
Table E.10: Result of Super Android Analyser for Clash-Royale
Millionaire 2018
Issue Severity
Web-view insecure implementation. This issue could allow
to a remote attacker to code execution in Web-view and
performing Cross Site Scripting attacks.
Critical vulnerability
This applications is performing checks for rooted device.
This could be use to execute specific code if the device is
rooted to take control of it.
High critically vulnera-
bility
Using weak algorithms allows an attacker to break the ci-




The exceptions thrown by a method should be specific.
Generic Exception type could could not be safe and lead
to silent error suppression.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Exception catching should be specific. Generic Exception
type could not be safe and lead to silent error suppression
Low critically vulnera-
bility
This method is not as random as it is supposed to be. It
should not be use to generate OTP codes.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Sleep Method is used with vars as arguments. If those vars




Sensitive information should never be logged since it can
lead to that information being disclosed.
Low critically vulnera-
bility




This application is using Base64 encoding. This is not a
secure method to encode data.
Warning
This application is using Base64 decoding. Warning
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported provider was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private IPs.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private URLs.
Warning
Table E.12: Result of Super Android Analyser for Millionaire 2018
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Insecure application SSL implementation. This application
accepts all certificates, including self signed by default. This
is a critical issue as Man in the Middle attacks may be per-
formed.
Critical vulnerability
This application is vulnerable to SQL injection. Any data
stored in database can be exposed as any attacker is able to
retrieve, modify and delete the stored information.
Critical vulnerability
This applications is performing checks for rooted device.
This could be use to execute specific code if the device is
rooted to take control of it.
High critically vulnera-
bility
Using weak algorithms allows an attacker to break the ci-




Application can read/write in external storage. Any app
can read data written in external storage.
High critically vulnera-
bility
This option allows backups of the application data via adb.
Malicious people with physical access could use adb to get
private data of your app into their PC.
Medium critically vul-
nerability
Exception catching should be specific. Generic Exception
type could not be safe and lead to silent error suppression
Low critically vulnera-
bility
This method is not as random as it is supposed to be. It
should not be use to generate OTP codes.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Sleep Method is used with vars as arguments. If those vars




Sensitive information should never be logged since it can
lead to that information being disclosed.
Low critically vulnera-
bility




This application is using Base64 encoding. This is not a
secure method to encode data.
Warning
This application is using Base64 decoding. Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of hard-coded certificate or keystore.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private email information.
Warning
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported activity-alias was found. It can be used by other
applications.
Warning
Exported receiver was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported service was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
The application is recording the device network operator
name. This process might be performed without the user’s
knowledge.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private IPs.
Warning
The application needs a large heap. This is not a vulnerabil-
ity as such, but could be in devices with small heap. Check
if the large heap is actually needed.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private URLs.
Warning
Table E.14: Result of Super Android Analyser for LOCKit
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My Passwords - Password Manager
Issue Severity
Applications is creating temp files. Sensitive information
should never be written in temp files.
High critically vulnera-
bility
Application can read/write in external storage. Any app
can read data written in external storage.
High critically vulnera-
bility
This option allows backups of the application data via adb.
Malicious people with physical access could use adb to get
private data of your app into their PC.
Medium critically vul-
nerability
Exception catching should be specific. Generic Exception
type could not be safe and lead to silent error suppression
Low critically vulnera-
bility
This method is not as random as it is supposed to be. It
should not be use to generate OTP codes.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Sensitive information should never be logged since it can
lead to that information being disclosed.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Table E.15: Result of Super Android Analyser for My Passwords
Issue Severity
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private email information.
Warning
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private URLs.
Warning






This option allows backups of the application data via adb.
Malicious people with physical access could use adb to get
private data of your app into their PC.
Medium critically vul-
nerability
Exception catching should be specific. Generic Exception
type could not be safe and lead to silent error suppression
Low critically vulnera-
bility
This method is not as random as it is supposed to be. It
should not be use to generate OTP codes.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Sensitive information should never be logged since it can
lead to that information being disclosed.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Even if the application can create its own permissions, it’s




Table E.17: Result of Super Android Analyser for Always on AMOLED
Issue Severity
This application is using Base64 encoding. This is not a
secure method to encode data.
Warning
This application is using Base64 decoding. Warning
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported receiver was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Exported service was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private URLs.
Warning
Table E.18: Result of Super Android Analyser for Always on AMOLED
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Flashlight
Issue Severity
Exception catching should be specific. Generic Exception
type could not be safe and lead to silent error suppression.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Sensitive information should never be logged since it can
lead to that information being disclosed.
Low critically vulnera-
bility
Table E.19: Result of Super Android Analyser for Flashlight
Issue Severity
The decompilation of the source code could lead to the dis-
closure of private email information.
Warning
Exported activity was found. It can be used by other appli-
cations.
Warning
Table E.20: Result of Super Android Analyser for Flashlight
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